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DAMAGES FOR INDIRECT PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT 
DMITRY KARSHTEDT

  
ABSTRACT 
In many patent infringement cases, the only practical way that the 
plaintiff can obtain relief is on a theory of secondary liability, which is 
generally referred to as indirect infringement. The remedy in patent cases 
frequently includes damages for past infringement. Because jury verdicts 
in patent cases can amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, patent 
damages have become a hotly litigated issue. Nevertheless, much to the 
frustration of the litigants in these high-stakes lawsuits, the courts 
continue to struggle to clarify how damages for indirect infringement 
should be determined. 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction over patent cases, has deepened the confusion over 
calculating damages. Two opinions from the Federal Circuit have made 
contradictory pronouncements on the issue of accounting for proven acts 
of primary (i.e., direct) infringement in determining damages for indirect 
infringement. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. held that the 
extent of directly infringing use of the patent should be viewed as one of 
many pieces of evidence for measuring the extent of damages (“the 
evidentiary approach”). In contrast, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude 
Medical, Inc. endorsed a rule that enables trial judges to limit damages as 
a matter of law to proven, enumerated acts of direct infringement of the 
asserted patents (“the atomistic approach”).  
The conflict between the two approaches raises fundamental, 
unanswered questions concerning the relationship between patent 
infringement and ordinary torts. This Article fills a gap in the literature by 
identifying, and working toward unraveling, one of the puzzles of indirect 
infringement. Specifically, it examines what the legal fiction of formally 
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imputing an act of one entity to another—an important tenet of secondary 
liability in tort—means for patent damages. The answer is surprising: the 
atomistic approach is consistent with the principles of tort law, but is at 
odds with well-established, general rules for determining patent damages. 
Conversely, the evidentiary approach seems to ignore tort law’s 
imputation principle and embodies the pragmatic, patent-specific damages 
rules that the atomistic approach eschews. This Article resolves the 
tension in favor of the evidentiary approach and explains that 
considerations of policy, logic, and precedent support a damages analysis 
that reflects fundamental differences between patent law and tort law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Secondary liability in various areas of law, sometimes also called 
“indirect liability,”1 entails holding a party liable for the wrongdoing of 
another, “primary” actor—the person who actually performed the 
offending act.
2
 One familiar example of such liability is vicarious liability, 
which is derived from a special relationship (e.g., agent-principal or 
 
 
 1. See Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 221, 228 & n.18 (2006) (discussing various terms used to describe third-party 
liability). 
 2. See Joachim Dietrich, Accessorial Liability in the Law of Torts, 31 LEGAL STUD. 231, 231 
(2011) (explaining that “accessorial liability is the mechanism by which the law holds a third party 
(the accessory, A) responsible for ‘legal injury’, often damage, suffered by P as a result of a principal 
wrongdoer’s wrong, such that A is liable for the legal injury done to P” and noting that “[a]ccessorial 
liability is sometimes described as ‘secondary liability’, meaning that liability is dependent on 
another’s primary liability”) (emphasis added). Dietrich goes on to point out an important 
terminological distinction:  
The term ‘secondary liability’ is not appropriate for all cases of accessorial liability, 
however. Some examples of true accessorial liability have themselves developed into 
discrete wrongs, such as most examples in which the tort of conspiracy is alleged . . . and 
perhaps the tort of inducing breach of contract. 
Id.  
 I use the phrase “independent tort” to denominate “assessorial liability” that is not a form of 
secondary liability. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 305. See generally Mark P. McKenna, 
Probabilistic Knowledge of Third-Party Trademark Infringement, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10 
(discussing the difference between secondary liability for another party’s acts and liability for one’s 
own negligence that caused or permitted the tortious conduct of another party). 
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employee-employer) between the primary actor and the entity on which 
such liability is imposed.
3
 In contrast, certain affirmative acts that aid and 
abet, encourage, induce, or otherwise facilitate the commission of a tort by 
the primary actor provide another, distinct basis for secondary liability.
4
 
Whatever the basis, the law treats the indirectly liable party as if it were 
the person who committed the wrongdoing, subject to the same penalties 
as the primary actor, or “principal”; some courts and commentators 
explain that the acts of the principal are treated as “imputed” to the 
aider-and-abettor.
5
 Criminal law, for example, may punish an 
aider-and-abettor to the same degree as the principal.
6
 Likewise, tort law 
impliedly relies on the imputation principle when it treats the secondary 
actor as jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff along with the primary 
actor.
7
  
The law of patent infringement, a cause of action that is often described 
as a species of a property tort,
8
 incorporates indirect liability provisions. 
 
 
 3. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 181–82 (2d ed. 
2002) (explaining that, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “employers are vicariously liable 
even absent their own negligence, for torts committed by their employees ‘within the scope of 
employment’”).  
 4. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2012) (“‘One who aids, 
abets, or incites, or encourages or directs, by conduct or words, . . . the perpetration of a trespass is 
liable equally with actual trespassers.’”) (quoting Walls v. Moreland Altobelli Assocs., Inc., 659 
S.E.2d 418, 421 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)); Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“To 
establish a claim against the wife [for civil assault carried out by the husband], the plaintiff would have 
had to present ‘evidence that she assisted, supported, or supplemented her husband’s action or that she 
instigated, advised, or encouraged the commission of the tort.’”) (quoting Duke v. Feldman, 226 A.2d 
345, 348 (Md. 1967)). 
 5. See Hazel Carty, Joint Tortfeasance and Assistance Liability, 19 LEGAL STUD. 489, 491 
(1999) (“Where there is the necessary participation the law will . . . ‘impute’ the commission of the 
same wrongful act to two or more persons at once. The key issue is how close these participation links 
come to rendering facilitators or assisters liable.”) (footnote omitted). 
 6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006) (“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or 
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 7. See, e.g., Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[A] party who 
aids or abets the commission of a tort is ‘jointly and severally liable therefor’ . . . .”) (quoting Hinton v. 
Bryant, 367 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ark. 1963)); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 
721 (6th Cir. 1897) (“From the earliest times, all who take part in a trespass, either by actual 
participation therein or by aiding and abetting it, have been held to be jointly and severally liable for 
the injury inflicted.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (“Infringement, 
whether direct or contributory, is essentially a tort, and implies invasion of some right of the 
patentee.”); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915) (“[T]he 
exclusive right conferred by the patent was property and the infringement was a tortious taking of a 
part of that property . . . .”); see also Thomson-Houston, 80 F. at 721 (“An infringement of a patent is a 
tort analogous to trespass or trespass on the case.”). 
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Similar to other areas of law that prescribe such liability,
9
 the Patent Act 
holds indirectly liable those who cause others to infringe or aid in the 
commission of directly infringing acts.
10
 As with secondarily liable parties 
in other areas of tort law, indirect infringers are jointly and severally liable 
with direct infringers
11
 to the patent owner.
12
 Nevertheless, when it comes 
to calculating damages for indirect patent infringement, applying the 
imputation principle can—surprisingly—lead to erroneous results. I argue 
in this Article that the imputation principle can cause problems when 
combined with the most established approach for calculating damages in 
patent law—the so-called “hypothetical negotiation” approach. 
There are reasons to be cautious before drawing direct analogies 
between patent law and tort law. Although common-law principles often 
motivate the analysis of secondary liability for intellectual property torts,
13
 
there are many important differences between general secondary civil 
liability and indirect patent infringement. For example, claims of indirect 
 
 
 9. See Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The 
statutory liability for inducement of infringement derives from the common law, wherein acts that the 
actor knows will lead to the commission of a wrong by another, place shared liability for the wrong on 
the actor.”); Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 635, 685 (2008) (“[T]he law of indirect infringement conforms to general tort law for the most 
part.”).  
 10. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be 
liable as an infringer.”); § 271(c) (establishing the basis for liability as “a contributory infringer”). It is 
worth noting that, according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, there is a difference between 
aiding-and-abetting and inducement. See Adams, supra note 9, at 639–43 (explaining that section 
876(b) of the Restatement provides the basis for “aiding and abetting” liability for “substantial 
assistance” to the primary tortfeasor, while section 877(a) imposes “inducement” liability on one who 
“orders or induces” tortious conduct). Nevertheless, the courts generally use the terms “aid-and-abet” 
and “induce” interchangeably to refer to acts giving rise to liability under § 271(b). See, e.g., Tegal 
Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., 248 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“‘[T]he term [inducement] is as 
broad as the range of actions by which one in fact causes, or urges, or encourages, or aids another to 
infringe a patent.’”) (quoting Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1963)); Rodime 
PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Inducement requires proof that the 
accused infringer knowingly aided and abetted another’s direct infringement of the patent.”).  
 11. Section 271(a) provides the basis for direct infringement liability.  
 12. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 500 (1964) (describing 
a contributory infringer’s relationship to a direct infringer as that of a “joint-tortfeasor”); Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (explaining “joint 
tortfeasance” theory of inducement of infringement); Thomson-Houston, 80 F. at 721. See also 
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 400 (2006) (“Liability for active inducement of infringement and contributory 
infringement are variations of third-party liability, where one party is held liable for the directly 
infringing acts of others. The justifications for these rules are the same as those used to rationalize 
joint and several liability elsewhere in tort law . . . .”). 
 13. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930–31, 934–
35 (2005) (establishing inducement liability for copyright infringement); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 9–10.  
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infringement in patent law, and in intellectual property law in general,
14
 
are asserted much more frequently and command a significantly greater 
degree of attention than analogous claims in general tort law.
15
 In the 
well-known case of Halberstam v. Welch, Judge Patricia Wald described 
secondary civil liability tongue-in-cheek as an area of law where 
“[p]recedent, except in the securities area, is largely confined to isolated 
acts of adolescents in rural society.”16 Although this area of law has surely 
grown in stature since Halberstam was decided,
17
 there is no doubt that in 
intellectual property law, including patent law, secondary liability is of 
relatively greater significance than in general tort law. Some of the most 
important patent, copyright, and trademark cases of recent years have been 
predicated on theories of indirect infringement.
18
 In the area of patents, 
commentators and courts agree that indirect infringement causes of action 
often provide the patentee with the only effective form of legal recourse 
and are normatively justified: “[t]he goal of secondary liability is to give 
patent owners effective protection in circumstances in which the actual 
infringer either is not the truly responsible party or is impractical to sue.”19  
 
 
 14. See, e.g., Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 398 (2006) (“[T]he doctrines of contributory 
infringement and inducement of infringement are stronger than ever, having been extended by the 
Supreme Court to cover copyright infringement through the use of VCR’s and file sharing on the 
Internet.”); Mark Bartholomew, Copyright, Trademark and Secondary Liability After Grokster, 32 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445 (2009) (discussing novel issues pertaining to secondary liability in trademark 
and copyright law). 
 15. See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The Divergent 
Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 
1364 (2006) (“As intellectual property owners have increasingly turned to secondary liability theories, 
the courts have responded by enunciating substantial reinterpretations of extant principles, thereby 
precipitating a veritable secondary liability revolution.”). Of course, this phenomenon could be due in 
part to the challenges in applying tort law principles to new technologies.  
 16. 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 17. See generally Eugene J. Schiltz, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting: Should Lawyers Be 
“Privileged” To Assist Their Clients’ Wrongdoing?, 29 PACE L. REV. 75, 76–85 (2008) (discussing the 
“flood of civil aiding and abetting cases in the last quarter century”). 
 18. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) (inducement liability for 
patent infringement); Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (inducement liability for copyright infringement); 
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (contributory trademark infringement); see 
also McKenna, supra note 2 (discussing indirect trademark infringement); Alfred C. Yen, Torts and 
the Construction of Inducement and Contributory Liability in Amazon and Visa, 32 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 513 (2009) (discussing indirect copyright infringement cases following Grokster). 
 19. Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 228 (2005). See 
Holbrook, supra note 12, at 400–01 (“[T]he indirect infringer may be more morally culpable than the 
direct infringers. Indeed, the inducers may be considerably more culpable in the patent infringement 
context because direct infringement is a strict liability offense.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Dawson 
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980) (“[T]he policy of stimulating invention that 
underlies the entire patent system runs . . . deep. And the doctrine of contributory infringement, which 
has been called ‘an expression both of law and morals,’ can be of crucial importance in ensuring that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/3
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The fact that circumstances encountered in indirect patent infringement 
cases can differ quite dramatically from those in secondary liability cases 
in general tort law underscores this point. In tort law, aiding-and-abetting 
and inducement cases often involve encouragement or assistance to a 
specific individual who then goes on to commit an intentional tort.
20
 In 
contrast, a typical scenario in an inducement of patent infringement case 
occurs when a manufacturer sells a product that includes patented 
technology and comes with instructions or other tools that direct end users 
to employ it in such a way as to infringe the patent directly (think of 
familiar items like Microsoft Word, Microsoft Outlook, and Rubik’s 
Cube).
21
 The end users generally have no idea that a patent on the 
technology exists, let alone that they are infringing it,
22
 and are almost 
 
 
the endeavors and investments of the inventor do not go unrewarded.”) (quoting Mercoid Corp. v. 
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 677 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); Ricoh Co. v. Quanta 
Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that “because ‘it may be impossible to 
enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical 
alternative [is] to go against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability.’”) (quoting 
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929–30); Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Infringement as Criminal Conduct, 19 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 26 (2012) (“[W]ithout inducement, the patent holder ‘is left with the 
potentially enormous burden of proceeding against the numerous direct infringers who purchased the 
copied product.’”) (quoting Mixing Equip. Co. v. Innova-Tech, Inc., No. 85-535, 1986 WL 14541, at 
*3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 1986)). 
 20. See, e.g., Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (defendant is liable for 
wrongful death for aiding and abetting a murderer). Of course, there are many examples of indirect 
liability where the primary act is not violent. See Schiltz, supra note 17, at 76 (documenting expansion 
of secondary liability for assisting fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and the like); see also Bigio v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing basis for civil liability for aiding and 
abetting trespass). 
 21. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 850–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 
131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (liability for inducement of infringement where online materials provided 
detailed instructions for using a software feature in an infringing manner and the defendant’s internal 
emails suggested that it knew of the patent and of the infringing nature of the software); Lucent Techs., 
Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (similar); Moleculon Research Corp. 
v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“circumstantial evidence of extensive puzzle 
sales, dissemination of an instruction sheet teaching the [claimed] method of restoring the preselected 
pattern with each puzzle, and the availability of a solution booklet” were sufficient to impose 
inducement liability on the manufacturer of Rubik’s Cube where end users directly infringed the 
claimed method by solving the puzzle); see also Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068–71 (clarifying the 
requisite level of knowledge of patent for inducement liability to attach). 
 22. This is because direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) is a strict liability offense. See, 
e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). See generally Roger 
D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 799 (2002) (exploring in what sense patent infringement is a strict liability tort). There is a small 
nuance in the strict liability rule: If the patent owner or licensee is manufacturing a product covered by 
a patent, then 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) essentially requires notice to potential infringers by prohibiting 
recovery of damages during the period when no notice was given. This requirement can be met either 
by actual notice or by the “marking” of the patented product with the word “pat.” or “patent” and the 
patent number. But the marking statute does not apply when the patent owner is not manufacturing a 
product. See Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 398 (1936). Moreover, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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never themselves sued by the patent owner.
23
 In Lucent Technologies, Inc. 
v. Gateway, Inc.,
24
 an important case that I will discuss extensively in this 
Article, computer users were found to directly infringe the plaintiff’s 
asserted patent,
25
 therefore opening the door for the defendants’ 
inducement of infringement liability.
26
 The infringing acts constituted 
selecting appointment dates and times by clicking on Microsoft Outlook’s 
calendar display.
27
 Most readers who have used this so-called 
“date-picker”28 feature of the Outlook calendar would be very surprised if 
they were served with a patent infringement complaint.  
Given the factual differences and the heightened importance of 
secondary liability in intellectual property law, the courts sometimes pause 
before relying too heavily on the formalisms of tort law in indirect patent 
infringement cases. The sense that the inducer who provides the enabling 
technology is the real tortfeasor, while the primary actor is something of a 
passive instrumentality,
29
 may explain some seemingly anomalous results 
 
 
§ 287(a) does not apply at all to method (sometimes called “process”) claims, which are typically 
asserted in inducement of infringement cases. See Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Beverage 
Can Co., 559 F.3d 1308, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also infra text accompanying notes 52–53 
(explaining what method claims are and why their assertion often requires indirect liability theories). 
Thus, end users would normally have no notice that they are infringing such claims unless they are 
actually sued for direct infringement.  
 23. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Seller and User Liability in 
Intellectual Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (“The good news for unwitting consumers is 
that the patent rule [imposing liability on end users] is, as far as we can tell, almost never enforced 
against private, noncommercial users of inventions, which perhaps explains why so few people are 
aware that the consumer . . . is, technically, an infringer.”). Commercial end users do get sued, 
however. See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Patent trolls want $1,000—for using scanners, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 2, 
2013, 8:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-using-
scanners; see also Colleen V. Chien & Edward Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being Sued En 
Masse for Patent Infringement and What Can Be Done, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 235 (2014) 
(documenting direct infringement lawsuits against commercial end users like hospitals and small 
companies). 
 24. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 25. Id. at 1317–20. 
 26. Id. at 1323; see infra Part II.A for a discussion of the direct infringement element of indirect 
infringement liability.  
 27. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1310–11; U.S. Patent No. 4,763,356 (filed Dec. 11, 1986) (issued 
Aug. 9, 1988), claims 19 & 21. 
 28. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1317. 
 29. Of course, the steps taken to infringe the claims, like solving the Rubik’s Cube, are acts 
driven by independent human will. The point is that, in sharp contrast to primary tortfeasors in other 
civil inducement cases, direct patent infringers generally have no idea that they are engaged in tortious 
conduct, and are unlikely to get sued. Furthermore, if not for the fact that direct infringement is a strict 
liability tort, direct infringers in this context would resemble criminal law’s “innocent 
instrumentalities.” Under the innocent instrumentality doctrine, a party that uses an unknowing agent 
to perpetrate a crime is directly liable for the crime, while the agent is not liable at all. See, e.g., Bailey 
v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 37, 40 (Va. 1985) (“[O]ne who effects a criminal act through an 
innocent or unwitting agent is a principal in the first degree.”). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2006); see United 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/3
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in the arena of secondary liability for intellectual property torts.
30
 For 
example, in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., the en 
banc Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) refused to 
impose direct “joint-tortfeasor” liability when multiple entities together 
carry out all the steps of a patented method.
31
 The Federal Circuit held that 
“extending liability in that manner would ensnare actors who did not 
themselves commit all the acts necessary to constitute infringement and 
who had no way of knowing that others were acting in a way that rendered 
their collective conduct infringing.”32 But the court also ruled that a party 
that induces the performance of all of the steps by a combination of 
entities can be liable for indirect infringement under these circumstances.
33
 
This was a surprising result because it allowed for secondary liability 
when no party could be held liable as a primary infringer.
34
  
Although several scholars have examined the ways in which tort law 
principles inform secondary liability in intellectual property law,
35
 the 
issue of damages for such liability remains undertheorized.
36
 Specifically, 
 
 
States v. Rapoport, 545 F.2d 802, 806 (2d Cir. 1976) (interpreting section 2(b) to impose liability on 
“one who puts in motion or assists in the illegal enterprise or causes the commission of an 
indispensable element of the offense by an innocent agent or instrumentality”) (citation omitted). I 
thank Professor Youngjae Lee for suggesting that I make this point. 
 30. Cf. McKenna, supra note 2 (analyzing indirect trademark infringement in terms of traditional 
tort principles but lamenting that the courts frequently depart from these principles).  
 31. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (per curiam), rev’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). See infra note 52 for an 
explanation of method claims. 
 32. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1307. 
 33. Id. at 1309. The Supreme Court reversed this holding as this Article went to press. See 
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2014 WL 2440535, at *4–5 (2014). 
 34. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication: The Federal 
Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505, 529 (2013) (“[A]ccording to . . . commentators, the court [in 
Akamai] largely misconceived the [joint-tortfeasor] doctrine.”) (citing Lynda J. Oswald, Unexpected 
Hazards of a Specialized Patent Court: Lessons from Joint Infringement Doctrine, in THE CHANGING 
FACE OF U.S. PATENT LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON BUSINESS STRATEGY 131 (Daniel R. Cahoy & Lynda 
J. Oswald eds., 2013)) (other citation omitted); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial 
Consequences of Akamai, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 513 (2012) (“The Federal Circuit took a 
unique step in Akamai by redefining active inducement of patent infringement.”); Josh Rychlinski, 
Note, Interactive Methods and Collaborative Performance: A New Future for Indirect Infringement, 
20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 215, 241 (2013) (“Akamai has announced a new standard for 
indirect infringement, but has disturbed almost all of the modern era indirect infringement doctrine . . . 
by removing the direct infringement prerequisite.”). See generally Brendyn M. Reinecke, Note, 
Akamai: Patent Claims Are Now Broader than the Invention, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1231 (criticizing 
Akamai). 
 35. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 9; Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing 
Infringement, 64 VAND. L. REV. 675 (2011); Holbrook, supra note 12; McKenna, supra note 2; Yen, 
supra note 18.  
 36. The problems associated with proving reasonable royalty damages for inducement of 
infringement are flagged in a recent article by Andrew Ward. See Andrew Ward, Inducing 
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the principle of formally imputing the wrongdoings of primary tortfeasors 
to the indirect infringer
37
 has confounded the courts’ management of 
patent damages.
38
 According to that principle, the plaintiff should recover 
from the indirect infringer the sum total of the damages that it would have 
recovered from all direct infringers, had they all been sued instead of the 
indirect infringer.
39
 Taken to a logical extreme, the imputation formalism 
would require calculating damages that each direct infringer who was 
induced by the indirect infringer (for example, each customer who used 
the date-picker feature of Outlook) would owe the patent owner, and then 
summing them up to calculate the damages owed by the indirect infringer. 
In general tort law, this approach makes intuitive sense: if an inducer 
trained one thief to steal a plaintiff’s wallet and another thief to steal that 
plaintiff’s watch, the plaintiff suing the inducer on the theory of secondary 
liability for conversion would seek damages for precisely the sum total of 
two items stolen by the two different thieves.
40
  
Something seems odd about the individualized approach in patent 
cases, however. The relatively large numbers of direct infringers involved 
in the Outlook case and many other indirect patent infringement actions
41
 
make particularized damages determinations for each consumer 
unmanageable, and maybe even unimaginable. Generally, a large, 
undifferentiated mass of direct infringers is a distinctive feature of 
 
 
Infringement: Specific Intent and Damages Calculation, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 1, 26–
29 (2012). Mr. Ward’s article discusses Lucent but does not address the inducement damages holding 
in Cardiac Pacemakers, which is in significant tension with Lucent and adopts an approach that I 
generally criticize here. See infra Part IV.B.3; see also Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 
576 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 37. See supra text accompanying notes 5–12; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (8th ed. 
2004) (defining secondary liability as “[l]iability that does not arise unless the primarily liable party 
fails to honor its obligation”). 
 38. If recent cases are any indication, judicial management of patent damages can make a 
difference to the tune of tens and potentially hundreds of millions of dollars. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 837 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1126–27 (S.D. Cal. 2011), on remand from Lucent 
Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (initial damages award an in indirect 
infringement case reduced from $357,693,056.18 to $70,000,000 after a new trial, and further reduced 
to $26,300,000 on remittitur). 
 39. See, e.g., Glenayre Elecs., Inc. v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 851, 858–59 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“[D]amages assessed for indirect infringement normally will be the same as damages that would be 
assessed had the patentee sued and obtained a judgment against the customers. . . . Indeed, in most 
cases damages assessed for indirect infringement will be equal to damages assessed for the underlying 
direct infringement.”) (citations omitted). 
 40. I owe inspiration for this example to Professors Charles Adams and William Von Glahn. See 
Amici Curiae Brief of Charles W. Adams and William Von Glahn in Support of Petitioner at 3, 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 
1701932, at *3. 
 41. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
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intellectual property cases involving claims of indirect liability,
42
 which by 
itself makes the tort analogy suspect.
43
 As I will aim to show in this 
Article, however, more is at stake than mere numbers. Indeed, one of my 
goals is to provide a general account of how and why damages for indirect 
patent infringement differ from damages for secondary liability in other 
areas of tort law.  
To be sure, I have not come across a case where the principle of 
imputation was taken to the formalistic extreme of calculating indirect 
infringement damages by adding up the damages occasioned by each 
individual end user. Some courts, however, take a step in that direction. In 
an approach I call the atomistic approach, they have limited damages that 
can be collected for indirect infringement to proven acts of direct 
infringement.
44
 A contrasting approach, which I call the evidentiary 
approach, relies on the extent of directly infringing use as one of the 
factors that aids in the calculation of damages for indirect infringement.
45
 I 
argue in this Article that the atomistic approach is fully justified by 
general tort law principles but is a bad fit for patent law, which is better 
served by the evidentiary approach. 
Let me make clear that I have nothing against judicial management of 
patent damages in general. Motions to limit damages as a matter of law, or 
to restrict methods of calculating damages available to the plaintiff
46—
 
 
 42. Claims involving the pattern “one indirectly liable party/many directly liable parties” do 
occur in other areas of tort law. Attempts to hold firearm manufacturers civilly liable for injuries 
caused with the aid of the weapons they provided constitute one example. See, e.g., Shane Wagman, 
Note, No One Ever Died From Copyright Infringement: The Inducement Doctrine’s Applicability to 
Firearms Manufacturer Liability, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 689, 689 (2010) (exploring the contours of 
such claims after noting that “[b]ringing successful lawsuits against firearms manufacturers for harms 
to gun violence victims caused by a third party’s criminal gun use has been a near-impossible task”) 
(footnote omitted); see also infra text accompanying note 96. 
 43. In copyright law, the Grokster and Napster cases, where large numbers of end users engaged 
in directly infringing sharing of MP3s and other types of files, come to mind. See Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see also infra note 89 and accompanying text for a further exploration of 
the breakdown of the analogy between general secondary liability in tort and secondary liability in 
intellectual property law.  
 44. See, e.g., Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (upholding the grant of summary judgment limiting indirect infringement damages to device 
units proven to infringe directly). 
 45. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(refusing to limit damages to proven acts of direct infringement). 
 46. See WILLIAM C. ROOKLIDGE ET AL., COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ISSUES IN PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT CASES: A POCKET GUIDE FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 22–26 (2011) 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/damagespatent.pdf/$file/damagespatent.pdf 
(cataloguing damages issues amenable to summary disposition under Federal Circuit law); see also 
infra Part V.A.3. 
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even before the determination of liability—are often proper, and properly 
granted.
47
 I explain, however, that grants of motions to limit damages for 
indirect infringement to proven instances of direct infringement are often 
highly problematic. Patent law approaches damages calculations in ways 
that are quite different from general tort law, and a lot can go wrong if the 
courts hew too closely to general tort principles and tie indirect 
infringement damages to directly infringing conduct in a formal manner. 
Indeed, basing such damages on proven acts of direct infringement, all 
while holding fast to traditional principles for calculating “reasonable 
royalty”48 damages for patent infringement, may be logically incoherent. 
Something has to give. I aim to demonstrate that, given the choice 
between rigid adherence to tort law principles and continued reliance on 
the approach specifically developed for calculating patent damages, the 
latter is preferable. 
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I briefly discuss 
the requirements for establishing indirect patent infringement liability. In 
Part III, I review the methods for calculating patent damages with an eye 
toward principles that can aid in understanding the similarities and 
differences between the evidentiary and atomistic approaches. In Part IV, I 
describe and critique the two approaches. I use two representative cases, 
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.
49
 and Cardiac Pacemakers, 
Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,
50
 to illustrate the contrast between them.  
In Part V, I explain why, for both pragmatic and theoretical reasons, 
the evidentiary approach is better suited to measuring indirect patent 
infringement damages than the atomistic approach. On the pragmatic side, 
I argue that the atomistic approach is likely to create confusion and lead to 
error, possibly resulting in the systematic underestimation of damages in 
inducement of infringement cases. I then show that the atomistic approach 
is at odds with established rules for calculating patent infringement 
damages, and discuss why a grant of a motion to limit indirect 
infringement damages to proven instances of direct infringement as a 
matter of law would rarely be correct. On the theoretical side, I 
 
 
 47. But see Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Promega Corp., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1649 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994) (denying as premature a motion for summary adjudication of patent damages, which was 
brought prior to determination of liability). 
 48. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the 
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by 
the court.”) (emphasis added). 
 49. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 50. 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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demonstrate that the evidentiary approach is consistent with the intuition 
that the invasion of the patentee’s legal right to exclude is fundamentally 
caused by the activities of the indirect infringer rather than by the end 
users. I also explain why the evidentiary approach does not impermissibly 
extend the scope of patents to unpatented items. In the Conclusion, I 
summarize my arguments why the evidentiary approach reflects sounder 
policy and promotes doctrinal coherence.  
II. PRINCIPLES OF INDIRECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
The Patent Act provides two sources of indirect infringement 
liability—inducement of infringement under § 271(b) and contributory 
infringement under § 271(c). The former section says that, “[w]hoever 
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”51 
Often, plaintiffs must rely on indirect infringement theories when they 
seek to enforce so-called “method claims”52 and are unable to show that 
the defendant has itself carried out all of the steps of the patented 
method.
53
 In a typical inducement scenario, a manufacturer makes and 
 
 
 51. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006). 
 52. Briefly, method or process claims have the form “a method for . . .”, followed by a recitation 
of steps. In contrast, apparatus or machine claims have the form “an apparatus for . . .”, “a device 
comprising . . . ”, and so on, followed by a recitation of structural elements of the claimed apparatus, 
machine, or device. See Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-To-Reproduce Inventions: Process 
Elements and Biotechnology’s Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & 
TECH. L.J. 109, 118 (2011) (illustrating method and apparatus claims). For example, in Moleculon, the 
Rubik’s Cube case, one of the asserted method claims recited: 
3. A method for restoring a preselected pattern from sets of pieces which pieces have 
constantly exposed and constantly nonexposed surfaces, the exposed surfaces adapted to be 
combined to form the preselected pattern, which sets when in random engagement fail to 
display said preselected pattern which comprises: 
a. engaging eight cube pieces as a composite cube; 
b. rotating a first set of cube pieces comprising four cubes about a first axis; 
c. rotating a second set of four cubes about a second axis; and 
d. repeating steps (b) and (c) until the preselected pattern is achieved. 
Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1986). If the plaintiff cannot 
show that the defendant, who manufactures Rubik’s Cube, performed steps (a)–(d), it cannot establish 
direct infringement liability against the defendant under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), and only indirect 
infringement theories (e.g., inducement under section 271(b)) remain. In addition, the ability to pursue 
the manufacturer for the infringement of its customers on indirect infringement theories increases the 
potential damages available to the plaintiff. 
 53. No such difficulty usually exists with apparatus claims, see supra note 52, because the sale of 
the apparatus embodied in the claims constitutes an act of infringement for which the manufacturer 
could be held directly liable under § 271(a). See, e.g., Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, 
Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) 
(“When claims are directed to a product or apparatus, direct infringement is always present, because 
the entity that installs the final part and thereby completes the claimed invention is a direct infringer. 
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sells a device capable of performing the claimed method and provides 
instructions to use the device in a manner that, if followed, would result in 
infringement.
54
 For example, in the Outlook date-picker case, Lucent did 
not demonstrate that Microsoft used its own software to infringe the 
claims of Lucent’s patent,55 but provided enough evidence to show that the 
users of Outlook did so
56
 and proved other elements of inducement so as 
to hold Microsoft liable as an indirect infringer.
57
 
Section 271(c), a more complex provision, holds liable those who sell 
or offer for sale in the United States (or import into the United States) 
components of patented inventions that “constitut[e] a material part of the 
invention” with the knowledge that such components are “especially made 
or especially adapted for use in an infringement.”58 Further, for 
contributory infringement liability to lie, the accused component must not 
be “a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use.”59 By its terms, this provision is not limited to sales of 
components of mechanical inventions. For example, one case where a 
plaintiff succeeded on a theory of contributory infringement involved the 
defendant’s sale of a chemical compound that had no application but in the 
infringement of the method patented by the plaintiff.
60
 These facts points 
to a key distinction between contributory infringement and inducement: a 
sale of a component capable of substantial noninfringing uses cannot give 
rise to § 271(c) liability, but § 271(b) liability would still be possible if the 
accused indirect infringer’s conduct and state of mind have risen to the 
level of inducement.
61
 The focus of this Article is on inducement of 
infringement. In inducement cases, liability can lie when a product can be 
 
 
But in the case of method patents, parties that jointly practice a patented invention can often arrange to 
share performance of the claimed steps between them.”) (emphasis added). While Akamai addressed 
the special problem of “divided infringement”—i.e., splitting of steps of a method claim between 
different entities—in a run-of-the-mill inducement case against a manufacturer, a single end user 
carries out all the steps of the claimed method and could thus, in theory, be held liable for direct 
infringement.  
 54. “Device” is not limited to tangible devices like Rubik’s Cube. As we have already seen, the 
“device” in question can be software capable of performing the claimed method. See supra text 
accompanying note 21. 
 55. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 56. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1317–19 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also infra 
Part II.A (discussing the direct infringement element of indirect liability).  
 57. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1321–23. Microsoft was also held liable on the alternative theory of 
contributory infringement. Id. at 1320–21. 
 58. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). 
 61. See infra Parts II.B & II.C (discussing the intent and act elements of inducement of 
infringement). 
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(and often is) used in a noninfringing manner.
62
 This interesting 
circumstance tests, and sometimes strains, the connection between direct 
and indirect infringement in the analysis of damages. 
Generally, the elements required to establish secondary liability in tort 
are “(1) the existence of an underlying tort; (2) the defendant’s knowledge 
of the underlying tort; and (3) that the defendant provided substantial 
assistance to advance the underlying tort’s commission.”63 So it is in 
patent law, which requires proof of underlying direct infringement, 
knowledge of the direct infringement,
64
 and acts of inducing or aiding 
infringement.
65
 Focusing on inducement of infringement, I will next 
consider each element of indirect patent infringement in turn.  
A. The Direct Infringement Element 
Some of the confusion over indirect infringement damages stems from 
the role that proven acts of direct infringement play in establishing liability 
in indirect infringement cases. Consonant with other areas of law 
governing secondary liability, one of the elements needed to establish 
indirect patent infringement is primary liability—in other words, direct 
infringement.
66
 The courts agree that, in order to prove indirect 
infringement, the showing of primary infringement need only be de 
 
 
 62. One of the best-known cases presenting facts that gave rise to inducement liability but not 
contributory infringement liability is actually a copyright case, which incidentally affirmed that 
indirect infringement theories in copyright law can be pursued on bases similar to those provided in 
§§ 271(b) and 271(c) of the Patent Act. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 913, 937 (2005) (holding that, even though substantial noninfringing uses for a peer-to-peer file 
sharing service exist, the service’s owner is indirectly liable for copyright infringement under the 
“inducement rule,” which “premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct”); see 
also id. at 940 n.13 (“[T]he culpable act is not merely the encouragement of infringement but also the 
distribution of the tool intended for infringing use.”). 
 63. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2012) (alterations and citations omitted) 
(stating the elements of civil aiding-and-abetting liability under New York common law). 
 64. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (mandating proof of the element of “knowing” that a 
component is “especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of a patent” to 
establish contributory infringement). In inducement cases, willful blindness to the fact that the directly 
infringing conduct constitutes patent infringement is sufficient. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. 
SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068–71 (2011); infra text accompanying notes 73–74. 
 65. The following formulation, provided in a jury instruction approved in DSU Medical Corp. v. 
JMS Co., is typical: “In order to induce infringement, there must first be an act of direct infringement 
and proof that the defendant knowingly induced infringement with the intent to encourage the 
infringement. The defendant must have intended to cause the acts that constitute the direct 
infringement and must have known or should have known than [sic] its action would cause the direct 
infringement.” 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part). 
 66. See supra text accompanying notes 63–65. 
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minimis.
67
 One Federal Circuit opinion stated, simply, that “inducement 
[of infringement] requires a threshold finding of direct infringement,”68 
and one trial judge characterized “evidence of direct infringement” as a 
“technical hurdle to establishing indirect infringement.”69  
The relationship between proven acts of direct infringement and 
damages for indirect infringement can be more complex. When analyzing 
damages, the courts in some cases have complicated the normally 
straightforward treatment of direct infringement as a minimal, threshold 
requirement for indirect liability. Some opinions conflate the distinction 
between liability and damages. Before reaching the question of damages, 
these cases appear to treat indirect liability as something like a series of 
discrete instances of indirect infringement that map onto specific directly 
infringing acts.
70
 I believe that this formalistic application of the 
imputation principle to indirect infringement damages often leads to error 
and constitutes bad policy.
71
 
B. The Intent Element 
The principal difference between proving direct, as opposed to indirect, 
infringement is that the former is a strict liability tort,
72
 while both 
secondary infringement theories require a culpable state of mind. The level 
of mens rea required for inducement liability had been a subject of 
vigorous debate among courts and commentators,
73
 which the Supreme 
 
 
 67. To be sure, the requirement is far from an empty one—litigants in some cases failed to make 
even the de minimis showing of direct infringement. See, e.g., Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple Inc., 692 
F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012); ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1313 
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 68. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (emphasis 
added). 
 69. Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 970, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 
(Whyte, J.) (emphasis added).  
 70. See supra text accompanying notes 37–44 (calling this the “atomistic” approach); see also 
infra Part IV.B (further explaining the atomistic approach). 
 71. See infra Part V. 
 72. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
 73. According to a Westlaw keycite search, the two leading Federal Circuit cases that seemed to 
require different mental states for inducement, Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., and 
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., have been cited in 179 and 119 law review articles, 
respectively, as of the time of this writing. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990); 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). (Note, however, that Manville was also significant in the law of the § 102(b) on-sale bar.) In 
2006, the issue was addressed by the en banc Federal Circuit in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 
F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part). The Supreme Court finally made a 
definitive pronouncement on the requisite mens rea for a finding of inducement in Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).  
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Court settled by holding that an inducer’s knowledge of, or willful 
blindness to, the fact that end users are infringing the patent is required for 
liability.
74
 In addition, “[t]he defendant must have intended to cause the 
acts that constitute the direct infringement.”75 Rightly or wrongly,76 this 
formulation appears to be consistent with that of general tort law. At least 
in some jurisdictions, elements of secondary liability in tort at common 
law include “knowledge that the primary wrongdoer owed the plaintiff a 
duty” and a showing that “the defendant acted to procure a breach of the 
primary wrongdoer’s duty to the plaintiff.”77 
C. The Act Element 
The plaintiff must also prove some affirmative conduct on the part of 
the accused infringer to meet the actus reus element of indirect 
infringement.
78
 For contributory infringement under § 271(c), the statute 
contemplates the acts of “offer to sell,” “sale,” and “import.”79 For 
§ 271(b), the courts have made it clear that the “actively induces” 
language of the statute requires affirmative acts on the part of the indirect 
infringer, such as providing instructions “which, if followed, would result 
in infringement.”80 There is no such thing as “passive” inducement.81  
 
 
 74. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068–71.  
 75. DSU, 471 F.3d at 1305. 
 76. For a sampling of recent articles criticizing the standard adopted by the Supreme Court, see 
Soonbok Lee, Note, Induced Infringement as a Strict Liability Claim: Abolishment of the Specific 
Intent Requirement, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 381 (2012) (arguing that inducement claims should 
be strict liability); Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1575 (2011) (criticizing subjective mental state requirements for inducement imported from tort 
law and calling for an objective standard); Sherkow, supra note 19 (arguing that the willful blindness 
standard is much more suited to criminal law than patent law); Ted Sichelman, Minding Patent 
Infringement (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 11-051, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/abstract=1734380 (arguing that intent to induce the infringing acts is sufficient mens rea for 
inducement, and knowledge that the acts constitute infringement is not required).  
 77. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Insight Tech., Inc. v. 
FreightCheck, LLC, 633 S.E.2d 373, 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)) (alterations omitted). 
 78. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(“[S]pecific intent and action to induce infringement must be proven.”) (citing Manville, 917 F.2d at 
554) (emphasis added); Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1963) (“[I]nducement 
has connotations of active steps knowingly taken—knowingly at least in the sense of purposeful, 
intentional, as distinguished from accidental or inadvertent.”). 
 79. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006). 
 80. Trevor J. Smedley & Ross A. Dannenberg, Enforceability of Machine Patents in Virtual 
Worlds, 13 J. INTERNET LAW 1, 7 (2010); see, e.g., Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 
1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Other examples of acts sufficient to support a finding of inducement include 
“[a]dvertising or promoting the use of a product in an infringing manner; . . . [p]roviding 
indemnification against infringement damages; and . . . [s]upplying or selling a product, knowing it 
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In an article on indirect liability for intellectual property infringements, 
Mark Bartholomew likens inducement of infringement to accomplice 
liability in criminal law, which is concerned largely with the mens rea of 
the defendant and requires very little in the way of an outward act to 
satisfy the actus reus element of the crime.
82
 Focusing on Grokster, a case 
in which a provider of a peer-to-peer file sharing service was held 
secondarily liable for copyright infringement, Bartholomew points out that 
the actus reus requirement is similarly de-emphasized for inducement 
liability in copyright law.
83
 This is the case because, like accomplice 
liability, “inducement infringement punishes people for their outward 
expressions of commitment to unworthy values.”84 Calling this a 
“causation-free”85 form of indirect infringement, Bartholomew notes that 
inducement liability will lie even when “the defendant tries to encourage 
the direct infringer’s illegal activity, but the direct infringer misses the 
defendant’s cues or already has its mind made up and does not need any 
additional egging on to commit the act of infringement.”86  
Although Bartholomew is correct that the level of activity legally 
required to meet the actus reus element of inducement is minimal, we have 
already seen that, in many § 271(b) cases, the inducing acts in fact turn out 
to be quite significant. These acts include providing instructions, training, 
advertising, and the like, that encourage customers to use the product (of 
course, also supplied by the inducer) in an infringing manner.
87
 Thus, in 
contrast to the “causation-free” scenarios discussed by Bartholomew, the 
facts of many induced patent infringement cases reveal a tight causal link 
between the acts of the inducer and harm to the plaintiff. I argue below 
that the nature of the inducing acts and the manner in which they cause 
 
 
will be used in an infringing manner.” Smedley & Dannenberg, supra, at 7 (collecting cases) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 81. See Lemley, supra note 19, at 232 n.34.  
 82. See Mark Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines: The Questionable Role of 
Criminal Law in Contributory Infringement Doctrine, 2009 BYU L. REV. 783, 805 (“[T]he actus reus 
requirement is of secondary importance as compared to the mens rea standard [in criminal law]. . . . 
[I]t does not take much to satisfy the actus reus standard in an accomplice liability case. The most 
trivial assistance is sufficient basis to render the secondary actor accountable for the actions of the 
primary actor. Proof of any form of participation is enough to support a conviction for accomplice 
liability, provided the requisite mental state has been established.”) (footnotes and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 83. Id. at 841–42; see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005). 
 84. Bartholomew, supra note 82, at 842. 
 85. Id. at 841. 
 86. Id. at 840. 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 21 & 80. 
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infringement to occur should inform how we think of damages for 
inducement of infringement.
88
 
D. Putting It All Together 
For now, the overall story seems relatively simple. Some idiosyncratic 
features aside, liability for indirect patent infringement appears to look a 
lot like general civil secondary liability, requiring proof of an underlying 
primary tortious act, the knowing state of mind of the inducer, and an 
overt act of inducement or substantial assistance to the primary tortfeasor. 
One area where the general tort-patent infringement analogy breaks down, 
however, is in the two torts’ respective approaches to damages.89 When 
measuring money damages in patent infringement actions, fact-finders 
must often determine the value of the invaded right by imagining that the 
parties negotiated over it and arrived at mutually acceptable license 
terms.
90
 While general tort law parallels to this sort of analysis do exist—
the calculation of the market rental value of the imposed-upon land in 
trespass cases comes to mind
91—the approach to measuring damages in 
patent law has a life all its own, relying on specialized principles not 
 
 
 88. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 89. The general tort-intellectual property infringement analogy also breaks down in that, at least 
in some indirect intellectual property infringement cases, knowledge of particular acts of infringement 
is de-emphasized and probabilistic harm is accepted as sufficient to meet the mens rea requirement. 
See McKenna, supra note 2, ¶¶ 8–10. As with the breakdown of the analogy in the area of damages, 
this breakdown is due in part to the fact that indirect intellectual property infringement cases present a 
diffuse, numerous, and poorly defined universes of direct infringers. See supra text accompanying 
notes 42–43. I thank Professor Mark McKenna for pointing this issue out to me. 
 90. See generally infra Part III.B. It is much more difficult to imagine this kind of a negotiation 
when measuring damages for accidents. See generally Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and 
Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989). But see Darryl Biggar, 
A Model of Punitive Damages in Tort, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 3–4 (1995) (“According to theory, 
the correct measure of the harm to the victim is the amount that the victim would have accepted ex 
ante to be induced to voluntarily undergo the injury. Just as some individuals value certain goods more 
highly than others, some individuals will be willing to pay more to avoid a certain injury than others. 
One individual might not willingly submit to a particular injury for anything less than $30,000 while 
another might refuse the injury unless offered $300,000.”) (footnote omitted). 
 91. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1823 (2009) (analyzing the problem of measuring damages for trespass); see also SIRKO 
HARDER, MEASURING DAMAGES IN THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: THE SEARCH FOR HARMONISED 
PRINCIPLES 191–94 (2010). The concept of market value, to be sure, is rather difficult to apply in the 
patent context because each patent represents a unique (i.e., novel and nonobvious) invention. As 
noted by Justice Cardozo in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., “[t]his is not a 
case where the recovery can be measured by the current prices of a market. A patent is a thing unique. 
There can be no contemporaneous sales to express the market value of an invention that derives from 
its novelty its patentable quality.” 289 U.S. 689, 697 (1933). 
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commonly encountered in the law of tort damages.
92
 The superficially 
similar property-tort cases that address “hypothetical-fee” damages93 are 
hardly an appropriate model for, say, the Outlook date-picker case.
94
 Even 
if tort law precedents were of some value, their number is limited—the 
factual scenario of “inducement of trespass” upon land,95 and particularly 
of one party’s inducement of a multitude of trespasses, appears to be quite 
rare.
96
 And so we are left with the questions of how to apply specialized 
patent damages doctrines to indirect infringement cases, and whether 
general tort law helps with this endeavor.
97
 It is to the issue of patent 
 
 
 92. Of course, there are many other significant differences between patent law and general tort 
law. For example,  
[i]n patent law, unlike in other areas of tort law—where the victim has no ability to define the 
injurious conduct upfront—the patentee specifically defines the boundaries of his or her 
exclusive rights in the claims appended to the patent and provides notice thereby to the public 
to permit avoidance of infringement.  
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(Linn, J., dissenting), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). How well claims define patent rights is a highly 
controversial question. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? 
Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1746–47 (2009) (questioning how 
well patent claims delineate property rights); Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 523, 525 (2010) (discussing problems with the notice function of claims). 
 93. HARDER, supra note 91, at 180–81, 191–92. Parchomovsky and Stein, in fact, believe that 
“market value” compensation for trespass to land does not adequately account for the invasion of the 
property right, though they focus on deliberate trespasses, where a negotiation is more than merely a 
theoretical possibility. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 91, at 1832–35. The authors explain: 
“[T]he trespasser [in some scenarios] can almost always negotiate a transaction with the owner before 
trespassing. The owner’s harm from a continuous trespass is different in kind from ordinary tort 
damages. This harm includes more than just a temporary occupation of the owner’s property, damage 
to her land and fixtures, the cost of removing the trespass, and the psychological harm suffered from 
all of the above. It also includes the violation of the owner’s right to exclude others.” Id. at 1834. 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 24–28.  
 95. See Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2012) (collecting cases, some of 
which, however, use “trespass” in the general sense of “trespass on the case” rather than trespass to 
land). 
 96. For an amusing example, see Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381, 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) 
(“Guille ascended in a balloon in the vicinity of Swan’s garden, and descended into his garden. When 
he descended, his body was hanging out of the car of the balloon in a very perilous situation, and he 
called to a person at work in Swan’s field, to help him, in a voice audible to the pursuing crowd. . . . 
When the balloon descended, more than two hundred persons broke into Swan’s garden through the 
fences, and came on his premises, beating down his vegetables and flowers.”) (emphases deleted). The 
court held that Guille was liable to Swan as a “co-trespasser” for the damage done by the crowd. Id. 
The National Academies’ complaints against ticket scalpers, reciting counts of inducement of trespass, 
provide more recent examples. See Complaint, Nat’l Acad. of Recording Arts & Sci., Inc. v. On Point 
Events LP, 256 F.R.D. 678 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2008) (No. 2:08-CV-00856), available at http://reporter. 
blogs.com/thresq/files/OnPointGrammys.pdf; First Amended Complaint, Acad. of Motion Picture Arts 
& Sci. v. Schy, No. BC330928 (Cal. Super. Ct., Cty. of L.A., June 2, 2005), available at http:// 
graphics8.nytimes.com/images/blogs/carpetbagger/ampas.pdf.  
 97. For a recent article arguing that tort law’s “make-whole” approach is generally unsuitable for 
measuring patent damages, see Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 517 (2014). 
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damages and its language of “reasonable royalty,” “hypothetical 
negotiation,” and “the book of wisdom” that we now turn. 
III. PRINCIPLES OF PATENT DAMAGES 
A. The Patent Act, Reasonable Royalty, and Lost Profits 
The remedies sections of the Patent Act do not distinguish between 
direct and indirect infringement—there are no separate rules for issuing 
injunctions or calculating damages for inducement of infringement or 
contributory infringement to be found in 35 U.S.C. §§ 283 or 284. Section 
284 states simply that “the court shall award the claimant damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”98 
The reasonable royalty provision, which places a floor on the amount of 
monetary damages available to the plaintiff,
99
 has been interpreted by the 
courts to call on the fact-finder to simulate a hypothetical patent licensing 
negotiation between the litigants.
100
 This approach triggers a highly fact-
intensive inquiry,
101
 in which the fact-finder must reconstruct the parties’ 
positions at the time when infringement began
102
 and determine the royalty 
terms of a patent license they would have entered into had there been a 
negotiation over the patented technology.
103
  
The lost profits method, a different approach to measuring patent 
infringement damages, requires “determin[ing] the sales and profits lost to 
the patentee because of the infringement.”104 This approach is used less 
 
 
 98. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).  
 99. See Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (“A reasonable royalty thus is not necessarily the measure of damages, but ‘is merely the floor 
below which damages shall not fall.’”) (quoting Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1583 
(Fed. Cir. 1983)).  
 100. See Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment To Rein in the Georgia-
Pacific Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 27 (2008) (“The most common approach taken by 
courts in determining a reasonable royalty is a ‘hypothetical negotiation[] between willing licensor and 
willing licensee.’”) (quoting Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).  
 101. See Patricia J. Kaeding, Comment, Clearly Erroneous Review of Mixed Questions of Law 
and Fact: The Likelihood of Confusion Determination in Trademark Law, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1291, 
1312 (1992) (noting that reasonable royalty analysis “require[s] a court to make a highly fact-specific 
inquiry based on the relevant evidentiary factors”). 
 102. See, e.g., Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(citing Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978)). 
 103. Formally, the fact-finder is asked to determine both the royalty rate and the royalty base as 
subsidiary findings in the reasonable royalty analysis. In some cases, however, the fact-finder may also 
award a lump-sum royalty. See infra text accompanying notes 115–16. 
 104. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing Del Mar 
Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).  
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commonly than the reasonable royalty method because it essentially 
requires the plaintiff to be a commercially active entity
105
 and presents 
some difficulties of proof,
106
 though it typically results in a higher 
recovery than the reasonable royalty measure.
107
 These two methods, and 
their combination, are generally available to plaintiffs in both direct and 
indirect infringement cases.
108
 Because the reasonable royalty method is 
the dominant approach to calculating patent damages, and is the only one 
that is, by statute, available in all cases, this Article will focus on 
reasonable royalty damages.
109
   
 
 
 105. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(“To recover lost profits, the patent owner must show ‘causation in fact,’ establishing that ‘but for’ the 
infringement, he would have made additional profits.”) (citing King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 
F.3d 941, 952 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); Amy L. Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 199, 242–43 
(2006) (“The fundamental question for determining whether a patentee can obtain lost profits is 
whether the patentee can demonstrate with reasonable probability that, but for the infringement, the 
patentee would have made the sales that were made by the infringer.”) (citing Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 
1545) (emphasis added). 
 106. See CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAW 210 (2008) (“[P]roving lost 
profits is a difficult business, and in some cases patentees will simply be unable to prove what ‘would 
have happened’ absent infringement; in these cases a reasonable royalty award is the only 
possibility.”).  
 107. Dennis S. Corgill, Competitive Injury and Non-Exclusive Patent Licensees, 71 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 641, 652 (2010) (“The general wisdom . . . is that lost profits damages will be greater [than 
reasonable royalty damages].”) (citing F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1324 (4th 
ed. 2008)); Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalty, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 655, 661 n.32 (2009) (providing an economic explanation for the difference in plaintiffs’ 
recovery between the two methods). But see Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978–80 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (reasonable royalty damages awarded were more than six times plaintiff’s lost profits once 
the “benefit conferred” on the defendant was considered); see also Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 
663 F.3d 1221, 1238–39 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“While either the infringer’s or the patentee’s profit 
expectation may be considered in the overall reasonable royalty analysis, . . . neither is an absolute 
limit to the amount of the reasonable royalty that may be awarded upon a reasoned hypothetical 
negotiation analysis. . . .”) (citing Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970)).  
 108. See State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he 
award may be split between lost profits as actual damages to the extent they are proven and a 
reasonable royalty for the remainder.”); Lawrence M. Sung, Patent Infringement Remedies, in 2 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES FOR THE DIGITAL 
AGE 169, 171 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (“[P]atent law permits damages awards to encompass both lost 
profits and a reasonable royalty on that portion of an infringer’s sales not included in the lost profits 
calculation.”). 
 109. I believe that the atomistic approach is usually in error when lost profits is the measure of 
damages, although for different reasons than the reasonable royalty. See infra note 336 and 
accompanying text. 
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B. Reasonable Royalty: Hypothetical Negotiation, the Book of Wisdom, 
Royalty Rate, and Royalty Base 
1. Basic Principles 
The purpose of the reasonable royalty provision is to measure the harm 
to the patentee’s “right to exclude”110 by acts of patent infringement, such 
as by the making, using, or selling of items—sometimes called “accused 
products”—that embody one or more claims of the patents in suit. The 
Federal Circuit explained that “[a] reasonable royalty calculation envisions 
and ascertains the results of a hypothetical negotiation between the 
patentee and the infringer at a time before the infringing activity 
began. Thus, the reasonable royalty calculus assesses the relevant market 
as it would have developed before and absent the infringing activity.”111 In 
an important recent case, Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
112
 the 
Federal Circuit reaffirmed the principle that the hypothetical negotiation 
analysis aims to guide the fact-finder toward arriving at commercially 
reasonable license terms that should serve as the basis for reasonable 
royalty damages.
113
 
In determining the reasonable royalty, the fact-finder is invited to 
consider a non-exclusive list of fifteen so-called “Georgia-Pacific 
factors,” which reflect considerations that the parties would have taken 
into account had they negotiated a patent license.
114
 These factors
115
 may 
 
 
 110. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (“[A patent grant provides] the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the 
invention into the United States.”). 
 111. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 869–70 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing 
Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002)), rev’d on other grounds, 
545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
 112. 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 113. Uniloc discarded the so-called “25% rule of thumb,” under which the reasonable royalty 
damages were typically calculated as “25 per cent of [the infringer’s] expected profits for the product 
that incorporates the IP at issue,” because that rule was inconsistent with the hypothetical negotiation 
approach. Id. at 1312 (quoting Robert Goldscheider, John Jarosz & Carla Mulhern, Use of the 25 Per 
Cent Rule in Valuing IP, 37 LES NOUVELLES 123, 123 (Dec. 2002)). After stating that “a reasonable 
royalty is often determined on the basis of a hypothetical negotiation, occurring between the parties at 
the time that infringement began,” the court explained that “the rule is essentially arbitrary and does 
not fit within the model of the hypothetical negotiation within which it is based.” Id. at 1312–13 (citing 
Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 869–70 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Of course, there are some 
accepted assumptions within the hypothetical negotiation framework that are not commercially 
reasonable, reflecting the fact that the “license terms” are determined during litigation and not in the 
course of an arms-length negotiation. See infra text accompanying notes 123–28. 
 114. See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 
modified sub nom. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
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be used to arrive at the terms of a hypothetical “ongoing” or running 
royalty—the royalty rate expressed as a percentage and the corresponding 
royalty base, such as the sales price of the infringing product. The two are 
then multiplied to achieve the final damages figure.
116
 The overall 
approach is counterfactual—after all, the parties would not have been in 
litigation had they entered into a license—and one Federal Circuit opinion 
colorfully characterized the hypothetical negotiation analysis as requiring 
“more the talents of a conjurer rather than those of a judge.”117 While this 
approach simulates the terms that a willing licensor would have agreed 
upon with a willing licensee, it is possible that the patent owner would not 
have been willing to license the patent at all.
118
  
Another challenge of the hypothetical negotiation approach is its 
temporal aspect. The fact-finder must imagine the negotiation at the time 
the infringement began, not at the time of litigation.
119
 Of course, the fact-
finder is not required to ignore completely events that occur after the 
initial instance of infringement.
120
 This “post-negotiation” information, 
 
 
 115. The Georgia-Pacific factors include the rates paid by the defendant “for the use of other 
patents comparable to the patent in suit”; the nature of the commercial relationship between plaintiff 
and defendant, “such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of 
business”; “[t]he established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial 
success; and its current popularity”; “[t]he utility and advantages of the patent property over the old 
modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results”; “the nature of the 
patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the 
licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention”; “[t]he extent to which the infringer 
has made use of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use”; and “[t]he portion 
of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented 
elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by 
the infringer.” Id. 
 116. Sometimes, however, the Georgia-Pacific hypothetical negotiation approach produces a 
lump-sum royalty figure rather than a combination of a royalty rate and a royalty base. See, e.g., 
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325–28 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also DONALD S. 
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.07[2][j][v] (2012) (summarizing and critiquing Lucent’s 
discussion of damages awards derived through the lump-sum rather than the ongoing-royalty approach 
and explaining what evidence plaintiffs would need to support a jury award of damages under either 
approach). 
 117. Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  
 118. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“The 
hypothetical negotiation is often referred to as a ‘willing licensor/willing licensee’ negotiation. 
However, this is an inaccurate, and even absurd, characterization when, as here, the patentee does not 
wish to grant a license.”).  
 119. See, e.g., Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“A 
reasonable royalty determination for purposes of making a damages evaluation must relate to the time 
infringement occurred, and not be an after-the-fact assessment.”); Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, 
Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 
575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978)). 
 120. See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 697 (1933) (“The use 
that has been made of the patented device is a legitimate aid to the appraisal of the value of the patent 
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such as the extent of the adoption of the accused product, may serve as a 
valuable “book of wisdom”121 informing the fact-finder about how the 
parties would have valued the patented invention at the time of the 
hypothetical negotiation. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Federal 
Circuit determined that the fact-finder overvalued the patented invention 
by focusing on the extent of infringing use and failing to “go back in time” 
to consider how the parties would have approached the licensing 
negotiation at the time of the first act of infringement.
122
  
There are other tricky and commercially unrealistic elements in the 
hypothetical negotiation approach. Because courts assess damages only in 
cases where a patent was found to be valid and infringed, the fact-finder is 
asked to calculate the royalty based on the assumption that the parties 
would have agreed upon the validity and infringement of the patent at the 
time of the negotiation.
123
 In real life, however, parties discount the royalty 
rate by the probability that the patent is invalid or not infringed.
124
 
Furthermore, in cases where injunctions are not granted, the courts worry 
that the damages award will approximate something like a compulsory 
 
 
at the time of the breach.”); accord Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (positing that “[t]he extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and 
any evidence probative of the value of that use” is one of the factors in determining the reasonable 
royalty). 
 121. Sinclair, 289 U.S. at 698. Justice Cardozo explained why “the book of wisdom” is helpful in 
patent cases:  
A patent is a thing unique. There can be no contemporaneous sales to express the market 
value of an invention that derives from its novelty its patentable quality. But the absence of 
market value does not mean that the offender shall go quit of liability altogether. The law will 
make the best appraisal that it can, summoning to its service whatever aids it can command.  
Id. at 697 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
 122. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 871 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rev’d on 
other grounds, 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (“The parties’ inability to project success at the pre-clinical 
research stage of the [project covered by a patent under a hypothetical license] weighs heavily in 
determining a reasonable royalty . . . .”); Riles, 298 F.2d at 1313 (“[The expert’s] models did not 
reflect what royalty rate a hypothetical negotiation between Shell and Riles would have yielded at the 
time the infringement began. Instead, the models reflected [the expert’s] assessment of the worth of 
[the accused product] at the time of the trial. Riles did not provide any evidence or testimony to show 
that [the expert’s] models reflected what the parties might have agreed to, at any time, particularly at 
the time the infringement began.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 270–74. 
 123. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The 
hypothetical negotiation . . . assumes that the asserted patent claims are valid and infringed.”); TP 
Orthodontics, Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1017, 1025 (E.D. Wis. 1991), 
aff’d, 980 F.2d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Schneider (Eur.) AG v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 813, 
847 (D. Minn. 1994). 
 124. See, e.g., Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating 
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 642 (2010) (“Nearly half of all litigated 
patents are held invalid, and many of the rest are not infringed. Patentees win only just under a quarter 
of the cases they bring. Companies negotiating a license know this, and licenses incorporate that 
uncertainty in the royalty rate.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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license.
125
 If money damages awarded in litigation are too close to the 
amount of royalties that the defendant would have had to pay anyway after 
an arms-length negotiation, there would be no incentive to negotiate—why 
not take one’s chances in litigation where you might win and not have to 
pay anything at all?
126
 Although the courts have not explicitly mandated 
adding a specific “kicker” to the hypothetically negotiated royalty rate to 
make patent damages awards seem less like compulsory licenses, royalty 
rates calculated in patent infringement cases are often much greater than 
the rates accepted in the industry.
127
 This result may reflect the “valid-and-
infringed” assumption as well as an implicit royalty kicker.128 
Various other aspects of the hypothetical negotiation approach remain 
controversial.
129
 By way of just a few examples, commentators have 
criticized the Georgia-Pacific factors as unwieldy and unhelpful,
130
 argued 
that the “valid-and-infringed” assumption has been misused and tends to 
overvalue patents,
131
 and contended that the Georgia-Pacific framework is 
 
 
 125. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978) 
(“The setting of a reasonable royalty after infringement cannot be treated . . . as the equivalent of 
ordinary royalty negotiations among truly ‘willing’ patent owners and licensees. That view would 
constitute a pretense that the infringement never happened. It would also make an election to infringe a 
handy means for competitors to impose a ‘compulsory license’ policy upon every patent owner.”). Cf. 
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 91 (analyzing an analogous problem in real property law). 
 126. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 124, at 642 (“[A] damage award that just reflected what 
parties to actual licenses agreed upon would systematically undercompensate patent owners. It might 
even encourage potential licensees to take their chances in court, figuring that if they lost they would 
just have to pay a normal license fee, though anyone who did in fact make that decision is probably a 
willful infringer subject to enhanced damages.”). But see Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable 
Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909, 925–34 (2009) (explaining 
why other considerations, including litigation costs and enhanced damages for willful infringement, 
can deter this kind of “rational infringement” behavior). 
 127. See, e.g., JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 508 (3d ed. 2009) (“[T]he Federal Circuit 
characterizes the hypothetical negotiation approach as an attempt to ‘do justice’ to the patentee, and in 
some cases has affirmed the award of royalty rates significantly above industry norms.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 128. See Love, supra note 126, at 916–19 (arguing that the reasonable royalty approach provides 
excessive damages and noting cases with “inflated” reasonable royalties).  
 129. For a comprehensive critique of the hypothetical negotiation construct, see John C. Jarosz & 
Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail 
Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769 (2013). 
 130. See generally Durie & Lemley, supra note 124 (criticizing the Georgia-Pacific factors and 
arguing for a simplified approach). 
 131. Love, supra note 126, at 920 (identifying “an ongoing trend in patent law nudging the 
reasonable royalty formulation further and further away from the traditional willing licensor-willing 
licensee negotiation and, therefore, from representing the market value of the patented invention,” so 
that “in setting reasonable royalties, finders of fact are not bound by the economic realities of the 
marketplace”); see also id. at 928–30 (discussing the “valid and infringed” assumption). 
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not appropriate for modern, complex multi-component inventions.
132
 The 
courts, for their part, have called the willing licensor/willing licensee 
framework “absurd,”133 and one opinion even observed that “the use of a 
willing licensee-willing licensor model for determining damages ‘risks 
creation of the perception that blatant, blind appropriation of inventions 
patented by individual, nonmanufacturing inventors is the profitable, 
can’t-lose course.’”134 Nevertheless, though certainly flawed in many 
respects, the Georgia-Pacific hypothetical negotiation approach continues 
to provide a solution to the difficult problem of measuring the legal harm 
to the right to exclude in the form of a reasonable royalty. Indeed, the 
courts still use it routinely to determine money damages in spite of 
scholarly (and judicial) critiques.
135
  
2. Summary and Implications 
The hypothetical negotiation attempts to simulate a contract (i.e., a 
patent license) and approximate commercial realities of the marketplace in 
order to aid the fact-finder in the determination of patent infringement 
damages. Several guiding principles become apparent from the 
hypothetical negotiation cases: (1) the fact-finder must focus on the 
parties’ positions at the time infringement began;136 (2) judges should 
generally resist parties’ attempts to advocate for arbitrary and inflexible 
rules to cabin what should be a highly fact-specific determination;
137
 and 
(3) the fact-finder must be guided by the evidence of what the parties 
 
 
 132. See Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable 
Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661. 
 133. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
 134. See Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Fromson v. W. 
Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).  
 135. See, e.g., Laserdynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 60 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(“This court has sanctioned the use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to frame the reasonable royalty 
inquiry. Those factors properly tie the reasonable royalty calculation to the facts of the hypothetical 
negotiation at issue.”) (citing Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
2011)); WhitServe, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 27 n.11 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reciting 
and applying the Georgia-Pacific factors); Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1238–
39 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 119–22; see also THE FED. CIRCUIT BAR ASS’N, MODEL 
PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 70 (2010), available at http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/ 
cpages/9004/Library/2012%20Updated%20FCBA%20Model%20Patent%20Jury%20Instructions.pdf 
(last updated Feb. 2012) (“[Y]ou should focus on what the expectations of the patent holder and the 
infringer would have been had they entered into an agreement at that time. . . . Although evidence of 
the actual profits an alleged infringer made may be used to determine the anticipated profits at the time 
of the hypothetical negotiation, the royalty may not be limited or increased based on the actual profits 
the alleged infringer made.”) (emphasis added). 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 112–13.  
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would have done had they participated in a real-world negotiation.
138
 In 
both direct and indirect infringement cases, the courts repeatedly 
emphasize the need to “go back in time” and approach the problem from 
the perspective of the parties in a manner that is as economically realistic 
as possible.
139
 
It is against the backdrop of these considerations that the next two Parts 
should be understood. On the one hand, the tort law principle of imputing 
the acts of the primary tortfeasor to the secondarily liable party,
140
 with the 
corollary that indirect infringers compensate the plaintiff for the harm 
occasioned by the direct infringers, pulls in the direction of tying indirect 
infringement damages to acts of direct infringement. Formally, then, the 
fact-finder must determine the extent to which the direct infringers have 
collectively harmed the patent owner’s right to exclude and “charge” this 
amount to the inducer.
141
 Nevertheless, one quickly realizes that a 
hypothetical negotiation between the plaintiff and multiple direct 
infringers, such as customers, makes little sense. Consistent with this 
intuition, the courts in indirect infringement cases typically assume, 
without even giving the question a second thought, that the relevant 
negotiation would have taken place between the plaintiff and the indirect 
infringer, rather than the multitude of individual direct infringers.
142
 This 
observation suggests that the imputation principle may not be very helpful 
in the analysis of reasonable royalty damages. 
The question is, then, whether the imputation principle and the 
hypothetical negotiation approach can be made consistent. The larger issue 
is what, if anything, judges should do about this tension—whether in their 
roles as jury instructors, fact-finders, evidence gatekeepers, or managers of 
patent damages in the procedural postures of summary judgment or 
judgment as a matter of law. The notion that, in many patent infringement 
cases, the inducer rather than the direct infringer is the “truly responsible 
party”143 complicates matters further. The next Part considers how the 
courts have grappled with these issues. 
 
 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 114–16. 
 139. See supra text accompanying note 122. See generally William C. Rooklidge & Martha K. 
Gooding, When Hypothetical Turns to Fantasy: The Patent Reasonable Royalty Hypothetical 
Negotiation, 80 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 700 (2010). 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 5–12. 
 141. See supra text accompanying note 39. 
 142. See, e.g., Laserdynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 60 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–26 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also infra Part 
V.A.2. 
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19. 
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IV. EVIDENTIARY AND ATOMISTIC APPROACHES TO INDIRECT 
INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES 
A. Lucent’s Evidentiary Approach: The Probative Value of Proven Acts of 
Direct Infringement for Indirect Infringement Damages 
1. Background and Infringement Liability 
With the background principles of indirect infringement and patent 
damages laid out, I now consider in detail Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. 
Gateway, Inc.,
144
 the Microsoft Outlook date-picker case. This case 
exemplifies the evidentiary approach to indirect infringement damages;
145
 
that is, an approach that uses proven acts of direct infringement as bearing 
on, but not determinative of, the amount of damages. 
The patent in suit in Lucent was directed to a “method of entering 
information into fields on a computer screen without using a keyboard,”146 
and accused products like Outlook could be used to infringe the patent’s 
method claims. Specifically, Lucent argued that the claims covered the 
date-picker feature of Outlook, which allows a computer user to schedule 
appointments by clicking on a graphical calendar layout.
147
 Lucent 
apparently could not, or did not try, to show that any employees of Dell, 
Gateway, or Microsoft, the defendants in the case, performed the patented 
method. Lucent thus had to rely on indirect infringement theories, seeking 
to hold the computer and software makers liable for the infringing acts of 
their customers.
148
  
The Federal Circuit upheld the jury verdict of infringement. The court 
concluded that substantial evidence supported all the elements of indirect 
liability, including direct infringement by Outlook users.
149
 It explained 
that “circumstantial documentary evidence . . . was just barely sufficient to 
permit the jury to find direct infringement by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”150 Relying on the notion that the number of proven directly 
infringing acts need only be de minimis to support a finding of indirect 
infringement, the court added that “the jury . . . could have reasonably 
 
 
 144. 580 F.3d 1301. 
 145. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 146. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1308. 
 147. Id. at 1317. 
 148. Id. at 1317–19. 
 149. Id. at 1317; see also id. at 1320–23 (holding that substantial evidence supported proof of the 
other elements of indirect liability); supra Part II (discussing the elements of indirect liability). 
 150. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1318. 
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concluded that, sometime during the relevant period from 2003 to 2006, 
more likely than not one person somewhere in the United States had 
performed the claimed method using the Microsoft products.”151  
2. Reasonable Royalty Damages 
The jury award of damages in Lucent was determined using the 
reasonable royalty method.
152
 At the damages phase of the trial, Lucent 
argued that the proper compensation would have been an eight percent 
royalty on the “110 million units of the three software products capable of 
practicing the methods of the asserted claims,”153 leading to a payout of 
$561.9 million. In contrast, Microsoft contended that a lump-sum payment 
of $6.5 million would have been adequate for licensing the claims that its 
customers directly infringed.
154
 The jury chose neither party’s number and 
awarded Lucent a lump sum of $357,693,056.18.
155
  
On appeal, the defendants (led by Microsoft, the maker of Outlook) 
challenged the damages award on several grounds. One of Microsoft’s 
arguments was that, for method claims, “damages [must] be limited to the 
proven number of instances of actual infringing use.”156 In other words, 
Microsoft wanted the court to allow assessment of royalties only on those 
sales of Outlook for which the plaintiff could prove that the end user 
actually utilized the software in an infringing manner. The Federal Circuit 
rejected this challenge.
157
 
In refusing to adopt Microsoft’s approach to limiting the damages, the 
court recognized that, in real-world licenses, royalties between a patentee 
and a manufacturer of a consumer product are not always tied to the extent 
of utilization of the claimed invention by end users. In so doing, the court 
articulated what it viewed as the proper role of proven directly infringing 
conduct in the damages analysis: 
Consideration of evidence of usage after infringement started can 
. . . be helpful to the jury and the court in assessing whether a 
royalty is reasonable. Usage (or similar) data may provide 
 
 
 151. Id. (emphasis added). 
 152. See supra Part III.B. 
 153. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1323. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1324. 
 156. Id. at 1323 (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)).  
 157. Id. at 1324. The court did vacate the award of damages on other grounds, ruling that it was 
“based mainly on speculation or guesswork.” Id. at 1335; see infra text accompanying notes 172–76. 
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information that the parties would frequently have estimated during 
the negotiation. . . .    
 On the other hand, we have never laid down any rigid 
requirement that damages in all circumstances be limited to specific 
instances of infringement proven with direct evidence. Such a strict 
requirement could create a hypothetical negotiation far removed 
from what parties regularly do during real-world licensing 
negotiations. As shown by the evidence in this case, companies in 
the high-tech computer industry often strike licensing deals in 
which the amount paid for a particular technology is not necessarily 
limited to the number of times a patented feature is used by a 
consumer. A company licensing a patented method often has strong 
reasons not to tie the royalty amount strictly to usage. . . . [P]otential 
licensors and licensees routinely agree to royalty payments 
regardless of whether the invention is used frequently or 
infrequently by the consumer. . . .  
 . . . The damages award ought to be correlated, in some respect, 
to the extent the infringing method is used by consumers. This is so 
because this is what the parties to the hypothetical negotiation 
would have considered.
158
  
This passage confuses matters slightly with its mention of “direct 
evidence.” One possible reading of the sentence ending with “specific 
instances of infringement proven with direct evidence” is that the damages 
base can never include instances of direct infringement not proven with 
direct evidence. This reading, however, cannot be correct because 
circumstantial (as opposed to direct) evidence is generally acceptable to 
support a jury verdict or a judge’s decision in all areas of law. It is up to 
the fact-finder to weigh the circumstantial evidence and infer from it the 
existence of facts that tend to prove liability or damages. Indeed, 
circumstantial evidence has been used to support everything from murder 
convictions to verdicts in products liability cases, and is often thought to 
be more probative than direct evidence.
159
 So it is in patent law. The courts 
in patent cases have consistently held that circumstantial evidence can 
 
 
 158. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1333–34 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 159. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 241, 241 (2006) (“Empirical research indicates that jurors routinely undervalue 
circumstantial evidence (DNA, fingerprints, and the like) and overvalue direct evidence (eyewitness 
identifications and confessions) when making verdict choices, even though false-conviction statistics 
indicate that the former is normally more probative and more reliable than the latter.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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support fact-finders’ determinations160—and it would have been absurd to 
rule otherwise. Lucent meant that direct evidence is not required to prove 
specific instances of direct infringement, and that damages must not 
always be limited to such instances. The reference to “direct evidence” is 
merely a truism. 
The rest of the passage makes clear that, in the Lucent court’s view, 
indirect infringement damages must not always be limited to proven 
instances of direct infringement. The court’s discussion of “real-world 
licensing negotiations” and “royalty amounts” that are not tied strictly to 
usage and paid out “regardless of whether the invention is used frequently 
or infrequently by the consumer”161 reinforces this conclusion. This 
discussion reveals that, to the Lucent court, evidence of the extent of the 
direct infringement was simply a useful “book of wisdom”162 that could 
help the fact-finder understand the positions of the parties at the time 
infringement began. This view is consistent with Federal Circuit opinions 
that came before Lucent, including the well-known case of Hanson v. 
Alpine Ski Valley Area, Inc.
163
 that Lucent cited. Crucially, the court did 
not authorize a rigid limit on damages based on the number of instances of 
direct infringement proven by direct (or circumstantial) evidence, and 
there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that its approach is limited to 
lump-sum awards only.
164
  
Lucent thus comports with the three principles of reasonable royalty 
analysis outlined above—the fact-finder should put itself into the shoes of 
the parties at the time of initial infringement, avoid inflexible rules, and 
attempt to account for what patent licensees and licensors do in the real 
world.
165
 Taking the construct of the hypothetical license negotiation 
seriously, Lucent held that the prevalence of directly infringing acts is 
relevant, but not determinative, in the reasonable royalty calculation. 
Under Lucent’s evidentiary approach, the number of proven acts of direct 
 
 
 160. See, e.g., Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“If 
[the defendant] is arguing that proof of inducing infringement or direct infringement requires direct, as 
opposed to circumstantial evidence, we must disagree. It is hornbook law that direct evidence of a fact 
is not necessary. ‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, 
satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’”) (quoting Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 
U.S. 325, 330 (1960)); see also Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668–69 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
 161. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1334. 
 162. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698 (1933). 
 163. 718 F.2d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also infra Part V.A.2 (discussing Hanson in greater 
detail).  
 164. See infra text accompanying notes 170–71. 
 165. See supra text accompanying notes 136–39. 
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infringement embodies one of the Georgia-Pacific factors
166—specifically, 
the eleventh factor, which is “[t]he extent to which the infringer has made 
use of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that 
use.”167  
Although the indirect infringer does not literally “make use” of the 
invention but rather induces or contributes to its manufacture, use, or sale 
(or import),
168
 the Lucent court was not deterred from applying the 
Georgia-Pacific hypothetical negotiation construct to the parties accused 
of indirect infringement. It understood that, once infringement liability has 
been determined, the subsequent reasonable royalty inquiry is a 
necessarily flexible task of intuiting how the parties would have valued the 
asserted claims in a license agreement.
169
  
Having adopted this approach in an indirect infringement case, Lucent 
logically viewed the patent owner as the “pseudo-licensor” and the indirect 
infringer as the “pseudo-licensee.” Based on Georgia-Pacific and its sense 
of commercial reality, the court understood that Lucent and Microsoft 
would have considered the predicted extent of the patented feature’s 
utilization by the direct infringers—here, Outlook users—in setting the 
royalty rate or determining the lump-sum royalty.
170
 Furthermore, if it 
were known at the time of the negotiation that the product to be licensed 
 
 
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 114–18. 
 167. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Ga.-Pac. 
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). To be sure, in cases where 
the reasonable royalty is calculated as a product of a royalty rate and base rather than a lump sum, 
Georgia-Pacific factors are typically thought to aid in determining the rate only. See CHISUM ON 
PATENTS, supra note 116, § 20.07[2], at 20-1218-19 (explaining that Georgia-Pacific factors are used 
to set a reasonable royalty rate). The rate is then multiplied by the royalty base, which is presumably 
determined by some separate inquiry. See infra text accompanying note 253. Nonetheless, this 
rate/base distinction is not a hard-and-fast rule that the courts adhere to rigorously in every case—the 
Georgia-Pacific factors are simply a guide for determining the royalty, however the fact-finder is to do 
it. See, e.g., Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (referring to the 
“amount of the reasonable royalty that may be awarded upon a reasoned hypothetical negotiation 
analysis under the Georgia-Pacific factors”) (emphasis added); see also CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra 
note 116, § 20.07[b], at 20-1275-65 (“Courts give weight to the licensing customs in the industry and 
actual licenses on comparable patents in determining both the royalty rate and the base for the 
reasonable royalty.”) (citation omitted); id. § 20.07[j], at 20-1422 (“No doubt there is nothing 
inappropriate in adopting a royalty base that the parties would likely have used in a real world 
negotiation . . . .”). However one gets there, it stands to reason that both the royalty rate and the royalty 
base must reflect what parties would have considered. See supra text accompanying notes 136–39. I 
thank Professor David Schwartz for bringing this point to my attention. 
 168. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 169. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324–25; see also supra text accompanying note 113. 
 170. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1334.  
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had significant noninfringing uses or included various noninfringing 
features, the parties would have surely taken these facts into account.
171
 
Ultimately, the court vacated the jury award because “[n]o evidence 
describes how many . . . users had ever performed the patented method or 
how many times,” which meant that Lucent failed to carry its “burden to 
prove that the extent to which the infringing method has been used 
supports the lump-sum damages award.”172 Thus, instead of capping the 
damages based on enumerated instances of directly infringing use, the 
court relied on substantial evidence principles to vacate a damages award 
that appeared to come out of thin air.
173
 To sustain the award, Lucent 
should have attempted to estimate what percentage of Outlook users 
performed the claimed method and relate it to the hypothetical license 
negotiation.
174
 Perhaps, Lucent could have even tried to argue that the 
parties would not have tied the royalty to the predicted extent of the usage 
of the claimed feature.
175
 The bottom line is that Lucent failed to provide 
the evidence needed to support the jury award of damages. 
Although it vacated the award, the Federal Circuit did not take up 
Microsoft’s apparent invitation to completely eliminate from the damages 
calculus those units of Outlook for which Lucent could not prove direct 
infringement.
176
 While Lucent should have presented more evidence than 
it did at trial to justify the award, it was not limited as a matter of law to 
reasonable royalties from only those sales of Outlook that ultimately led to 
infringing uses. Instead, the Federal Circuit held that the extent of actual 
use of the patented feature constitutes useful evidence of the parties’ 
valuation of the patented invention at the time of the hypothetical 
negotiation.  
 
 
 171. Id. at 1326–27, 1334. 
 172. Id. at 1334–35. 
 173. Id. at 1324 (“[The damages] award is not supported by substantial evidence and is against the 
clear weight of the evidence.”). 
 174. Id. at 1334. 
 175. Id. For example, the parties might not have closely tied the royalty to actual usage of the 
date-picker feature due to administrative costs of monitoring the usage (a fact that may be 
demonstrated by evidence of industry licensing customs). Nevertheless, if the claimed feature were to 
be rarely used, the fact-finder could well arrive at the conclusion that the parties to a hypothetical 
license would not have valued that feature very highly ex ante. If so, the fact-finder would award 
damages in the form of an accordingly low lump-sum royalty (or a very low royalty rate, in cases 
where the running royalty approach was used). The low damages amount would thus reflect the 
parties’ expectation of limited use of the patented feature in the licensed product. This is a simple 
application of the “book of wisdom” principle. See supra text accompanying note 162.  
 176. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1323–24, 1334.  
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B. The Atomistic Approach of Cardiac Pacemakers 
1. Background 
Lucent was decided on September 11, 2009. Less than a month earlier, 
on August 19, the Federal Circuit decided Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. 
Jude Medical, Inc.,
177
 a case that said something quite different about the 
relationship between indirect infringement damages and proven acts of 
direct infringement. Cardiac Pacemakers is emblematic of what I call the 
atomistic approach to indirect infringement damages.
178
 In this 
procedurally complex case,
179
 the plaintiff, Cardiac, accused St. Jude of 
infringing its patents by selling implantable cardiac devices (ICDs).
180
 As 
summarized by the Federal Circuit, “ICDs are small devices that detect 
and correct abnormal heart rhythms that can be fatal if left untreated. The 
ICDs . . . work by administering electrical shocks to the heart, those 
shocks being calibrated to restore normal heart functioning.”181 Crucial to 
the issue of damages on appeal, ICDs “can be programmed to administer 
different types of electrical shocks,”182 including a relatively familiar 
procedure called defibrillation
183
 and a lesser-known procedure called 
cardioversion. Defibrillation entails applying high-energy shocks to the 
heart to treat acute, life-threatening disturbances in the heart’s rhythm; by 
contrast, cardioversion requires less energy and is used to treat 
disturbances that are less severe.
184
 The ICD is typically capable of both of 
 
 
 177. 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Cardiac II”). 
 178. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Cardiac II, 576 F.3d at 1352–53 (recounting procedural history of the case). 
 180. Id. at 1352. The acronym “ICD” can sometimes stand for “implantable cardioverter 
defibrillator.” See What Is an Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator?, NAT’L HEART, LUNG, & 
BLOOD INST. (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/icd (last visited Jan. 
11, 2014). To make matters even more complicated, “ICD” can also stand for “implantable cardiac 
defibrillator.” See Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators (ICDs), MEDICINENET.COM, http://www. 
medicinenet.com/implantable_cardiac_defibrillator/article.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). As will 
soon become clear, however, “implantable cardiac device” was probably the definition of “ICD” with 
the least potential for creating unfair prejudice in the Cardiac Pacemakers litigation.  
 181. Cardiac II, 576 F.3d at 1352. 
 182. Id. 
 183. To be clear, the defibrillators at issue were implantable and not the external defibrillators one 
finds at stadiums and concert venues. 
 184. See Cardiac II, 576 F.3d at 1352 (noting that defibrillation delivers “relatively high power 
shocks”). 
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these modes of operation,
185
 but in some settings, an ICD unit might be 
used for defibrillation only.
186
 
At the outset of the litigation, in 1997, Cardiac asserted “numerous 
claims under four patents relating to implantable cardiac defibrillators.”187 
By the time the case reached the Federal Circuit for the fourth time in 
2009, however, only a single claim, claim 4 of U.S. Patent No. 4,407,288 
(“’288 patent”),188 remained at issue.189 This claim was drafted in 
dependent form,
190
 referencing claim 1, and read as follows: “4. The 
method of claim 1, wherein said at least one mode of operation of said 
implantable heart stimulator includes cardioversion.”191 For this method 
claim,
192
 Cardiac had to proceed on inducement and contributory 
infringement theories, arguing that directly infringing acts required for 
liability
193
 occurred when physicians who bought ICDs from St. Jude 
performed the patented method: “[Cardiac] emphasizes that all of St. 
Jude’s devices were capable of executing [infringing] cardioversion 
 
 
 185. See supra text accompanying note 180 (noting that “ICD” can stand for “implantable 
cardioverter defibrillator”). 
 186. Cf. Cardiac II, 576 F.3d at 1352. 
 187. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1023 (S.D. Ind. 2006) 
(“Cardiac I”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Cardiac II, 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 188. See U.S. Patent No. 4,407,288 col. 21, ll. 30–33 (filed Mar. 16, 1981) (issued Oct. 4, 1983). 
 189. Cardiac abandoned some of the claims early in the litigation and decided not to appeal 
unfavorable judgments on some of the other initially asserted claims. See Cardiac I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 
1026. 
 190. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 (2006) (“[A] claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a 
claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim 
in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to 
which it refers.”). 
 191. ’288 Patent, col. 21, ll. 30–33. The “parent” claim, claim 1, recites:  
1. A method of heart stimulation using an implantable heart stimulator capable of detecting a 
plurality of arrhythmias and capable of being programmed to undergo a single or multi-mode 
operation to treat a detected arrhythmia, corresponding to said mode of operation the method 
comprising the steps of:  
(a) determining a condition of the heart from among a plurality of conditions of the heart;  
(b) selecting at least one mode of operation of the implantable heart stimulator which 
operation includes a unique sequence of events corresponding to said determined condition; 
and  
(c) executing said at least one mode of operation of said implantable heart stimulator thereby 
to treat said determined heart condition.  
Id. col. 21, ll. 9–23. 
 192. See supra notes 52–53 for an explanation of the difference between method and apparatus 
claims. One of the claims abandoned by the plaintiff during the twists and turns of this litigation was 
claim 13 of the ’288 patent, an apparatus claim. See Cardiac I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1039. If the 
apparatus claim remained in the case, St. Jude might have become directly liable to Cardiac by making 
and selling ICD units capable of performing cardioversion, and an indirect infringement theory would 
have been unnecessary. 
 193. See supra Part II.A. 
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therapy, and . . . contends that St. Jude even instructed physicians how to 
program its devices to execute this therapy.”194  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed Cardiac’s challenges to 
various aspects of the district court’s judgment, including its grant of St. 
Jude’s “Motion for Summary Judgment Limiting [Cardiac’s] Damages”195 
for infringement of claim 4. The court’s decision in Cardiac Pacemakers 
is best known for its en banc portion, which addressed a different 
problem.
196
 Yet the panel part of the opinion that (among other things) 
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment order limiting damages,197 
to which I now turn, also raised some very interesting questions.  
2. Limitation of Damages 
The record showed that St. Jude’s ICDs had to be programmed by end 
users in order to perform cardioversion.
198
 Indeed, many physicians used 
the ICDs for applications that were more common than cardioversion, 
such as defibrillation and another procedure called cardiac pacing, and 
either never programmed the devices to perform cardioversion
199
 or did so 
but never actually utilized the devices to stimulate the heart by that 
technique.
200
 Based on these facts, the district court held that, “[a]s a 
matter of law, [Cardiac’s] damages for infringement of Claim 4 of the 
’288 patent are limited to only those devices that can be shown to have 
executed the claimed method of cardioversion during the relevant 
infringement period.”201 In a short section, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
 
 
 194. Cardiac I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1040; see also supra Part II.C (providing instructions to end 
users to utilize the device in an infringing manner can be sufficient actus reus for inducement liability). 
 195. Cardiac I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1039–44. 
 196. The proper interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), which governs secondary liability for 
inducing or contributing to infringing acts performed overseas, was the central issue on appeal. The 
Federal Circuit addressed that issue, which is beyond the scope of this Article, in the en banc part of 
the opinion (section C.2). The court discussed the issue of damages for inducing infringement within 
the United States in a separate section, C.1., which was not decided en banc. This Article focuses on 
section C.1 of the Cardiac Pacemakers opinion. For a brief discussion of the extraterritorial 
dimensions of the atomistic approach, see infra text accompanying note 348. 
 197. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“Cardiac II”). 
 198. Cardiac I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1039–42. 
 199. Id. at 1040 (“St. Jude has presented evidence that a number of its devices implanted during 
the relevant infringement period were programmed by implanting physicians to ‘DEFIB ONLY’ 
mode, making them incapable of executing a separate ‘cardioversion’ therapy unless and until they 
were reprogrammed.”). 
 200. Id. at 1039 (“St. Jude contends that the method claimed in Claim 4 was not practiced in a 
large number of its ICDs.”). 
 201. Id. at 1042. 
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this portion of the district court’s decision: In calculating “royalties on its 
patented method[,] . . . . Cardiac can only receive infringement damages 
on those devices that actually performed the patented method.”202 As I 
explain below, this approach is misguided because it conflates 
infringement liability analysis with the damages analysis. 
Because the Federal Circuit’s discussion of this issue was quite 
abbreviated, the district court’s approach requires further explication. The 
district court cited its own earlier opinion in the Cardiac Pacemakers case 
for the proposition that, “[t]o hold St. Jude liable for infringement on this 
method claim . . . [Cardiac] was required to come forward with some 
evidence of actual use of the infringing method by someone.”203 That 
ruling, however, was a judgment of no liability due to lack of proof of 
underlying direct infringement, and not a grant of a motion to limit 
damages.
204
 The court’s confusion between issues of liability and damages 
becomes apparent when one examines Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Flakt, 
Inc.,
205
 a case that it relied upon to support the “some evidence of actual 
use” proposition.206 Joy Technologies held that sales of a device capable of 
performing an infringing method do not result in liability, direct or 
indirect, unless the method is performed by someone during the term of 
the patent.
207
 That case, however, said nothing about limiting damages as a 
matter of law once the threshold finding of direct infringement was 
made.
208
 The Federal Circuit approved the district court’s reliance on Joy 
Technologies
209
 even though it was easily distinguishable because no 
indirect infringement liability at all was found in that case.
 
 
The district court’s choice of language, “cannot be held liable”210 rather 
than “does not owe damages,” is notable—it suggests an atomistic, 
particularized conception of indirect liability. Even though all the ICDs 
may be exactly the same, liability formally runs to the defendant via each 
particular ICD unit, so that the plaintiff must prove direct infringement for 
 
 
 202. Cardiac II, 576 F.3d at 1359. 
 203. Cardiac I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1040 (quoting Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 
No. 1:96-CV-1718-DFH-TAB, 2002 WL 1801525, at *29 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2002)). 
 204. Cardiac, 2002 WL 1801525, at *29. 
 205. 6 F.3d 770 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 206. Cardiac I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1040 (citing Joy Techs., 6 F.3d at 773–75 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).  
 207. Joy Techs., 6 F.3d at 775. 
 208. The Joy Technologies court did say that there could not be infringement “with respect to that 
plant,” suggesting a somewhat atomistic conception of liability. Id. Under the facts of that case, 
however, there was no infringement found for any of the plants sold. 
 209. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“Cardiac II”). 
 210. Cardiac I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1040. 
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each ICD in order to establish indirect infringement liability (and therefore 
be entitled to collect damages) for that unit. In other words, although 
Cardiac showed that some units have been used to practice the infringing 
method, it was barred as a matter of law from basing the royalty on all the 
ICDs that St. Jude sold in the absence of proof that each unit was used to 
perform the claimed method at least once.
211
 Summing up its atomistic 
approach, the district court stated that even though “all of St. Jude’s 
devices were capable of executing cardioversion therapy, and [Cardiac] 
contends that St. Jude even instructed physicians how to program its 
devices to execute this therapy[,] . . . . [n]one of these facts are sufficient 
to impose liability (and therefore damages) for every device sold.”212 This 
is tort law’s imputation formalism at work.  
It bears repeating that “devices that actually performed the patented 
method”213 of cardioversion are not qualitatively or intrinsically different 
from the devices that were not used to carry out the method. ICDs sold by 
St. Jude were identical units of the same kind of device, which were all 
capable of carrying out the cardioversion procedure. The district court 
elided this issue, and further conflated liability and damages, when it 
relied on Standard Havens Products, Inc. v. Gencor Industries, Inc.
214
 The 
court correctly characterized Standard Havens as holding that “method 
claims [were] not directly infringed by the mere sale of an apparatus 
capable of performing the claimed process,”215 but it did not appreciate 
that this case was not quite on point. The accused devices at issue in 
Standard Havens were asphalt plants that were used by the defendant’s 
customers to infringe a patented “method for continuously producing an 
asphaltic composition from asphalt and aggregates,” the so-called 
“counterflow” method.216 Three of the ten plants sold by the defendant, 
however, ran on another method, called the “parallel flow” method.217 The 
parallel flow plants were different from the counterflow plants. Not only 
 
 
 211. This requirement, however, does not have to translate into individualized proof of 
infringement for every unit of the device sold. Cf. Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal 
Indus., Inc., 1 F. App’x 879, 884 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (nonprecedential) (“We do not imply that [the 
plaintiff] is required to demonstrate a one-to-one correspondence between units sold and directly 
infringing customers. Proof of inducing infringement or direct infringement may be shown by 
circumstantial evidence.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 159–60. 
 212. Cardiac I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1040–41.  
 213. Cardiac II, 576 F.3d at 1359; see also supra text accompanying note 202.  
 214. 953 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 215. Cardiac I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1040 (quoting a characterization of Standard Havens from 
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., No. 1:96-CV-1718-DFH-TAB, 2002 WL 
1801525, at *29 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2002)). 
 216. Standard Havens, 953 F.2d at 1364–65, 1373. 
 217. Id. at 1373–74. 
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were the parallel flow plants never used in an infringing manner, but they 
were not even capable of infringing because they utilized a completely 
different mode of operation.
218
 The theory of “limitation of damages” in 
Standard Havens is wholly unremarkable: if I sue someone for indirect 
infringement arising from the use of device A, it generally makes no sense 
for me to collect damages from the use of an unrelated device B—which 
cannot be used in such a way as to perform the claimed method.
219
 The 
Federal Circuit in Standard Havens correctly held that sales of the B 
devices should be subtracted from the award of damages.
220
  
Perhaps one way to extend Standard Havens to the facts of Cardiac 
Pacemakers is to argue that a device that is never programmed to execute 
cardioversion is different in kind from one that is so programmed—similar 
to the A/B distinction above. The district court did attempt to cast the 
issues in this light by explaining “the distinction between all devices 
sometimes practicing the patented method and the very different situation 
of some devices never practicing the patented method.”221 But since all the 
devices in question are merely units of the same ICD, Standard Havens 
does not appear to support limiting damages as a matter of law to only 
those units that were used to perform the claimed method.
222
 The district 
 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Under some circumstances, however, damages for “convoyed” sales of unpatented items, 
along with damages for the patented items, can be properly assessed. See infra Part V.A.3.  
 220. See Standard Havens, 953 F.2d at 1374. 
 221. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1042 (S.D. Ind. 2006) 
(“Cardiac I”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 
1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Cardiac II”). 
 222. This point deserves additional explication. By itself, mere capability of infringement is not 
enough to justify including a noninfringing unit in the royalty base. Taking Lucent as an example, the 
fact that every personal computer is in principle capable of performing the patented date-picker 
function of Outlook (if the Outlook software were to be installed) cannot possibly lead to the 
conclusion that all the PCs in the universe are the proper royalty base for damages in that case. (I thank 
Professor Mark Lemley for providing this example.) If the damages in Lucent were analyzed on the 
basis of a running rather than a lump-sum royalty, the proper royalty base would likely be every 
Outlook software package sold, not every PC sold. At first blush, if an ICD is analogized to a PC, it 
might not make sense to include every ICD in the royalty base because it is merely capable of 
performing cardioversion.  
 The crucial difference between computers and ICDs, however, is the limited number of functions 
the latter has. Indeed, the main modes of ICD operation are defibrillation, cardioversion, cardiac 
pacing, and perhaps a few other ways of stimulating the heart. See Cardiac II, 576 F.3d at 1359. The 
device itself is sometimes simply called a cardioverter defibrillator, underscoring the importance of 
these two specific functions. See supra note 180. In contrast, the PC is a device with many uses. It is 
normally not called “a device for running Outlook,” though it might seem that way for some of us! 
Moreover, one needs to purchase a separate item (software) to make a computer run Outlook, while 
ICDs are typically sold with the inherent capability of being operated in defibrillation and 
cardioversion modes. 
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court never answered the key question: was there really no genuine issue 
of material fact that the parties would not have based a license to practice 
the cardioversion method on the sales of all ICD units, regardless of 
whether medical professionals ever used them to perform cardioversion 
(or ever programmed them to perform cardioversion)? 
Moreover, the district court ignored another crucial fact. The disputed 
royalty base in Standard Havens consisted of ten units—they were asphalt 
plants!—and one might imagine that parties to a negotiation in that case 
might have logically based the royalty on actual use given the small 
number of potentially infringing items. In contrast, the royalty for the 
cardioversion claim would have likely been based on each ICD sale rather 
than on usage, which would be very costly to monitor given that St. Jude 
sells tens of thousands of ICDs every year.
223
 It is thus a stretch to say that 
Standard Havens compels the result that the defendant “cannot be held 
liable for infringement of Claim 4 on a device that was not programmed to 
execute the claimed method of cardioversion.”224 It is even more of a 
stretch to argue that Standard Havens supports the conclusion that the 
plaintiff cannot collect damages on those devices that were so 
programmed but have not “executed the claimed method of 
cardioversion.”225 The Federal Circuit’s opinion says nothing about these 
problems in the district court’s reasoning. 
3. Tension with Lucent  
The tension between the Cardiac Pacemakers and Lucent approaches 
should by now be apparent. What is important is not only the difference in 
the result—the court limited damages as a matter of law to directly 
infringing devices in Cardiac Pacemakers, but refused to do so in 
 
 
 What does this all mean for the royalty base? Parties who are negotiating a hypothetical license 
for the cardioversion claim might logically base the royalty on the sales of all ICD units (with the 
expectation that they might be programmed to cardiovert), just as parties negotiating over the date-
picker claims might logically base the royalty on the sales of all Outlook packages (with the 
expectation that consumers would install the software and use the feature). 
 223. A (very rough) back-of-the envelope calculation suggests that St. Jude sold about 40,000 
defibrillators in 2011 alone. See Anjali Athavaley, Update: St Jude’s Profit Falls as Heart-Rhythm 
Sales Decline, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2012, 11:09 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-
20120125-710904.html (noting that St. Jude’s domestic ICD sales fell thirteen percent to $237 million 
in the fourth quarter of 2011). These numbers led me to assume an average sales revenue of about 
$250 million per quarter, and I used the price of roughly $25,000 for an average defibrillator. See, e.g., 
Mark A. Hlatky & Daniel B. Mark, The High Cost of Implantable Defibrillators, 28 EUR. HEART. J. 
388, 389 (2007). 
 224. Cardiac I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1040. 
 225. Id. at 1040, 1042. 
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Lucent
226—but the respective analytic approaches. In considering the 
defendants’ arguments for limiting damages as a matter of law, the Federal 
Circuit in Lucent asked how parties to a hypothetical licensing negotiation 
would have accounted for the consumers’ use of the claimed invention, 
and decided that, given customary licensing practices, actual use would 
not decisively limit damages.
227
 License agreements—even those 
involving method claims—are frequently based on sales of products 
capable of performing the method.
228
 To put it simply, if a customer buys a 
box of Outlook software but does not install it, and thus never practices 
the patented date-picker method, Microsoft would still owe Lucent a 
payment if the license agreement called for a royalty on every box sold.
229
 
Perhaps, license terms for performing cardioversion on ICDs would 
have been quite different from the per-box royalty that appears likely for 
the hypothetical Outlook/date-picker patent license. It may be that royalty 
obligations for practicing a claim directed only to cardioversion would be 
triggered only when the ICD was programmed to carry out the 
procedure.
230
 We do not know. What is remarkable about Cardiac 
Pacemakers, however, is that the opinions at both the district court and the 
Federal Circuit are completely devoid of any consideration of what the 
parties would have done had they been engaged in a negotiation. While 
Lucent warned that royalties are not always to be tied to actual use, and the 
extent of direct infringement is but one of the factors to be considered in 
royalty analysis, Cardiac Pacemakers removed the noninfringing units 
from the royalty calculation without any discussion of how the parties may 
have approached the hypothetical license agreement. 
Specifically, Lucent suggested that the fact-finder might account for the 
absence of directly infringing use of some units by arriving at a low 
royalty rate, so long as this information accurately reflected the parties’ ex 
 
 
 226. See also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 07-CV-2000-H(CAB), 2011 WL 
7664416, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. June 16, 2011), on remand from Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 
F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 227. See also infra Part V.A.2. 
 228. See, e.g., Sample Business Contracts: Patent License and Royalty Agreement, ONECLE, 
http://contracts.onecle.com/occulogix/stock.lic.2004.10.25.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). This 
agreement is a license for U.S. Patent No. 6,245,058 (filed Oct. 23, 1998) (issued June 12, 2001) 
(claiming methods for treatment of ophthalmological diseases). Section 6 of the agreement provides 
that “Royalty Payments shall be non-refundable and be calculated and paid based upon Total Net 
Revenues that Licensee . . . receives from the bona fide commercial sales of its Products sold in 
reliance and dependence upon the validity of the Patent’s claims.” Sample Business Contracts, supra 
(emphasis added). 
 229. Cf. Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (vacating 
the damages award where an expert’s models ignored the plaintiff’s “established licensing practice”). 
 230. See supra note 223 and accompanying text for an explanation why this is unlikely. 
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ante position that the patented method would not have been valued very 
highly.
231
 Cardiac Pacemakers, in contrast, simply cut those noninfringing 
units out of the royalty base ex post without any analysis. Of course, the 
two approaches might arrive at the same result if the fact-finder using the 
Cardiac Pacemakers approach realizes that excising noninfringing units 
out of the royalty base might result in an unrealistic negotiation, and 
increases the royalty rate to make up for the reduced royalty base.
232
 The 
Cardiac Pacemakers opinions, both at the district court and at the Federal 
Circuit, do not even begin to consider this problem. 
On remand in Lucent, Microsoft sought to apply Cardiac Pacemakers 
in its renewed attempt to limit damages “to only those instances where the 
claimed method is actually practiced”233 by including in the damages 
calculation only the “devices performing the patented method.”234 While 
the district court needed only to say that the Lucent panel opinion 
governed as the law of the case, it attempted to distinguish Lucent from 
Cardiac Pacemakers: 
Typically, damages can only be assessed on devices that perform 
the actual method. [Citing Cardiac Pacemakers.] In Lucent, the 
Court noted that Lucent had the burden to prove that its lump sum 
damages award was supported by the extent the infringing method 
was actually used. . . . On the other hand, the Federal Circuit in 
Lucent did not limit the consideration to only proven instances of 
infringement by direct testimony. The Lucent court specifically 
rejected Microsoft’s argument that “for method claims, [precedent] 
. . . requires that damages be limited to the proven number of 
instances of actual infringing use.”235  
As previously discussed, Lucent’s “direct evidence” language, referred 
to by the district court as “direct testimony,” is a red herring.236 As the 
district court recognized by citing the Federal Circuit’s rejection of 
Microsoft’s “proven number of instances” argument, Lucent was not about 
circumstantial versus direct evidence. Instead, Lucent was about not tying 
 
 
 231. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 232. This approach may be prone to error, however. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 233. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 07-CV-2000-H(CAB), 2011 WL 7664416, at *7 
(S.D. Cal. June 16, 2011), on remand from Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) 
(emphasis added) (other citation omitted). 
 236. See also supra text accompanying notes 159–60. 
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indirect infringement damages rigidly to the number of instances of 
directly infringing use.
237
 Furthermore, the district court understood that 
the hypothetical negotiation approach must take the realities of licensing 
practice into account, noting that “the administrative cost of monitoring 
use could be expensive and that for some inventions, value is added by 
simply having the patented feature available for use.”238 This view simply 
does not fit with the atomistic approach of Cardiac Pacemakers.
239
  
Instead of conceding that Lucent and Cardiac Pacemakers are probably 
not reconcilable, the district court subtly attempted to distinguish the two 
cases. It stated that “while damages do not have to be strictly tied to their 
usage numbers in a lump sum payment, Lucent must correlate its damage 
numbers to that usage.”240 But, as explained above, the Lucent opinion was 
not limited to lump-sum reasonable royalties.
241
 The phrase “lump sum” is 
not mentioned a single time in the Federal Circuit’s discussion of Georgia-
Pacific’s eleventh factor (“extent to which the infringer has made use of 
the invention”), which is the section on which the district court relied to 
reject Microsoft’s argument for limiting damages.  
To my knowledge, the Federal Circuit is yet to acknowledge this intra-
circuit conflict. While, as the earlier of the two decisions, Cardiac 
Pacemakers should control,
242
 an argument can be made that the rule of 
Cardiac Pacemakers itself contradicts established precedent, as it is 
inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s earlier damages cases.243 Moreover, 
as I demonstrate in the next Part, Lucent represents better policy.  
 
 
 237. Presumably, both the number of direct infringers and the frequency with which the direct 
infringers use the product in an infringing manner would be subsumed in this “extent of infringing 
use” analysis. See infra note 278 and accompanying text. 
 238. Lucent, 2011 WL 7664416, at *8 (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 239. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he district court was . . . correct in limiting damages to sales of ICDs that performed the steps of 
the claimed method.”). 
 240. Lucent, 2011 WL 7664416, at *8 (emphasis added). 
 241. See supra text accompanying notes 164–71. 
 242. See Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[P]rior 
decisions of a panel of the court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless and until 
overturned in banc.”); Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(Rich, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[W]here there are conflicting [panel] 
precedents, the earlier precedent controls.”). 
 243. See infra Part V.A.2. 
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V. EVALUATING THE EVIDENTIARY AND ATOMISTIC APPROACHES 
The atomistic approach to damages for secondary patent infringement 
is derived from the tort law principle of imputing the acts of a direct 
tortfeasor onto the inducer.
244
 The very word “secondary” implies that the 
defendant’s liability is dependent on another’s primary tort.245 Logically, 
then, if there is no primary act for which someone can be held liable, there 
is no secondary liability that could be associated with this act.
246
 This tort 
law principle, unstated in the Cardiac Pacemakers opinion, allowed the 
district court (and the Federal Circuit) to use precedents implicating 
liability for direct infringement of method claims to resolve damages 
issues. Both courts determined that, for every instance (i.e., for every unit 
of the accused device) where direct infringement could not be shown, the 
plaintiff could not collect damages.
247
  
Lucent’s evidentiary approach presents something of a counterpoint to 
the traditional tort law view of indirect liability, though the Lucent court, 
too, left some important assumptions unstated and did not make clear why 
it refused to rely on tort law’s imputation principle. In the sections that 
follow, I explain why Lucent represents the better view. The Lucent 
approach fosters greater accuracy in the damages calculus and is more 
consistent with general patent damages principles than Cardiac 
Pacemakers. Considerations of procedure, policy, and tort theory as 
properly applied to patent law also support the Lucent view.  
A. Pragmatic Reasons for Adopting the Evidentiary Approach 
1. The Atomistic Approach Is More Likely To Lead to Error and 
Confusion 
There is a simple rejoinder to my criticism of Cardiac Pacemakers. 
Suppose that the district court was wrong to excise from the royalty base, 
 
 
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 141–42. 
 245. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 246. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2014 WL 2440535, at 
*4 (2014). 
 247. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); see also Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770 (Fed. Cir. 1993). It is telling that subsequent 
decisions have used the damages section of Cardiac Pacemakers not for its specific damages holding, 
but for the more general, uncontroversial proposition that a method claim cannot be infringed by a 
device merely capable of performing the method. See, e.g., Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. Cellco P’ship, No. 
11-827-SLR, 2012 WL 1509504, at *4 n.7 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2012) (“‘The law is unequivocal that the 
sale of equipment to perform a process is not a sale of the process’ within the meaning of section 
271(a).”) (quoting Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1359) (emphasis added). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
956 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:911 
 
 
 
 
in the summary judgment posture, those ICD units that were never used to 
carry out cardioversion because parties to a licensing negotiation would 
have based royalties on sales of the devices and not on whether the 
claimed method was in fact executed. So what? Can’t the fact-finder just 
fix this problem by raising the royalty rate so that the end result—
(unrealistically high) royalty rate multiplied by the (unrealistically low) 
royalty base is the same as the (realistic) royalty rate multiplied by the 
(realistic) royalty base? My choice of the words “realistic” and 
“unrealistic” gives away which method I prefer, but if the courts are 
paying attention to what is going on, does it really matter if the number of 
units in the royalty base is reduced in contravention to what parties do in 
real-life negotiations? A district court addressed this point in Oak 
Industries, Inc. v. Zenith Electronics Corp.
248
 For reasons similar to 
Cardiac Pacemakers, it held that plaintiffs cannot collect damages on 
device units that were not shown to infringe, but added a cautionary note: 
Plaintiffs argue that royalties in negotiated licenses were based on 
the number of converters capable of infringing, rather than on the 
number that would infringe, because of the difficulty in determining 
how many converters would infringe the [claimed] method. 
Plaintiffs claim that we should look to these earlier licenses for 
guidance to any damage award. Plaintiffs confuse the license terms, 
which are not binding on courts, with the calculation of a reasonable 
royalty. These licenses may be evidence of a reasonable royalty but 
cannot substitute for evidence of the number of infringed 
converters. We do note, however, that because these negotiated 
licenses are based on the number of infringing capable converters, 
the royalty rate may not be applicable to a situation of calculating a 
reasonable royalty on infringing converters.
249
 
I commend the Zenith court for realizing that, once it reduced the 
number of units in the royalty base in the summary judgment posture, the 
royalty rate put in evidence for license agreements based on units that are 
“infringing capable” could no longer be trusted. But it seems to me that, 
based on its own analysis, Zenith’s reasoning is exactly backwards. If the 
court believed that extant negotiated licenses are good evidence of the 
reasonable royalty rate, why not use that rate along with the realistic 
royalty base of units that are “infringing capable”? Why create the extra 
 
 
 248. 726 F. Supp. 1525 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 249. Id. at 1544 (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted). 
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problem of having to adjust the royalty rate to account for the unrealistic 
situation where royalties are only paid out on units actually used to 
infringe?
250
  
There are already enough counterfactual elements inherent in the 
reasonable royalty calculation—for example, the royalty must be based on 
the assumption that the parties would have treated the patent as valid and 
infringed.
251
 Why create more complications with yet another adjustment, 
for which it might be difficult to find any reality-based signposts? The 
Zenith court, it seems, chose the route of potentially sacrificing accuracy 
on the altar of formalistic adherence to tort law principles. Clearly, the 
royalty rate that the parties would have negotiated depends on their 
assumptions about what has to be licensed. If the evidence supports the 
conclusion that the parties would have licensed “infringing capable” units, 
it stands to reason for the fact-finder to use them, rather than actually 
infringing units, as the royalty base. 
The Zenith court believed that the result it reached was compelled by 
§ 284 of the Patent Act. It relied on the language that “[t]he court shall 
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, 
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use of the invention 
by the infringer,” and reasoned that “[p]laintiffs’ interpretation [of 
including units that are merely ‘infringing capable’ in the royalty base] 
would impose liability on [the defendant] for non-infringing use.”252 But 
this approach is not preordained by statute. If one views damages for 
indirect infringement holistically as a hypothetical royalty to be paid by 
the inducer to the patentee, rather than atomistically as a set of discrete 
instances of compensating the patentee for each directly infringing act, 
inclusion of “infringing capable” units in the royalty base fits comfortably 
within the meaning of § 284. Indeed, nothing in the statute prohibits fact-
finders from calculating the “reasonable royalty for the use of the 
invention” by basing it on the number of all “infringing capable” units as 
long as the evidence supports the conclusion that the parties would have 
actually used these units as the base in their royalty agreement.
253
 As I 
 
 
 250. Moreover, recent Federal Circuit decisions have generally frowned upon the practice of 
correcting errors in the royalty base by adjusting the royalty rate. See Laserdynamics, Inc. v. Quanta 
Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 
1319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 251. See supra text accompanying note 123. 
 252. Oak Indus., 726 F. Supp. at 1543 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988)). 
 253. Cf. Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[R]oyalties 
[in real-world license agreements] may be based on unpatented components if that provides a 
convenient means for measuring the value of the license.”) (citing Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. 
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argue further below, this approach does not mean that the plaintiff is 
somehow being compensated for noninfringing conduct.
254
 
The problem, moreover, is that not all courts may be as attentive as the 
Zenith court to the issue of royalty adjustment. For example, neither the 
district court nor the Federal Circuit opinions in Cardiac Pacemakers 
flagged this issue, raising the possibility that the plaintiff would have been 
undercompensated if the damages award were to be based on a royalty rate 
that was incompatible with the “adjusted” royalty base.255 Thus, grants of 
motions to limit damages as a matter of law in this context invite reliance 
on the wrong the royalty rate and introduce thorny evidentiary problems. 
2. The Atomistic Approach Is in Tension with the Ex Ante Georgia-
Pacific Hypothetical Negotiation Framework 
This brings me to my next point. In direct infringement cases, the 
courts have made it clear that reasonable royalty damages are not always 
tied to the extent of directly infringing use. Indeed, overvaluing (or 
undervaluing) actual use of the claimed invention may introduce a 
hindsight bias that distracts the fact-finder from the task of intuiting the 
parties’ position at the time of the first instance of infringement.256  
 
 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950) and Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 
U.S. 100, 138 (1969)); Damien Geradin & Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value Apportionment Rules for 
Complex, Multi-Patent Products, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 763, 776–77 
(2011) (“[T]he base on which royalties are calculated must be objective and workable. . . . [T]he 
average selling price of the product containing the patented feature offers the greatest clarity, as those 
prices often will be observable in public documents. . . . [P]ractical concerns such as proper reporting 
do matter and must be considered in the apportionment debate [for setting a proper royalty base].”); 
see also Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent 
Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 751 (2011) (“Parties 
sometimes do choose sales revenue from sales of the end product as the royalty base, after all, as a 
matter of convenience; in such a case, there is no particular reason to avoid using such a base as long 
as it is accompanied by an appropriate rate.”). Cotter goes on to argue that, in Lucent, it was 
commercially unreasonable to have set the royalty at the price of an Outlook package, but does not 
suggest an alternative royalty base. Id. at 751–52. Cf. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The license agreements admitted into evidence . . . highlight how 
sophisticated parties routinely enter into license agreements that base the value of the patented 
inventions as a percentage of the commercial products’ sales price.”). 
 254. See infra Part V.B.2.  
 255. See supra text accompanying notes 230–32. The case settled after the Federal Circuit’s 2009 
opinion. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. 1:96-CV-1718-DFH/TAB, 2010 WL 
2696006 (S.D. Ind. May 5, 2010).  
 256. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Damages for Unlicensed Use, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 14 (2011) (“The 
ex ante measure is estimated as the hypothetical royalties that the owner would have negotiated in a 
hypothetical license, had the infringer approached him and sought to secure a license. This 
hypothetical royalty measure is merely an educated guess—an average. It reflects the expected value 
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Consider Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc.,
257
 a case that Lucent 
cited in its discussion of damages.
258
 In Hanson, the defendant infringed 
the method claims of a patent on “a method and apparatus for making 
snow used in winter sports”259 when running its snowmaking machines. 
The special master in charge of calculating damages adopted the analysis 
of the expert witness for the plaintiff, who argued that “the licensor would 
have insisted on a uniform license based on the gallons-per-minute rated 
capacity of the Hanson-method machines, and would have refused to grant 
a license based on actual use.”260 The Federal Circuit agreed with the 
special master and rejected the defendant’s contention that “the royalty 
should have been based upon actual use rather than upon estimated 
savings reflecting the snowmaking capacity of the machines.”261 
Underscoring the fact-driven nature of the reasonable royalty inquiry, the 
court held that “the record contains substantial evidence that actual use of 
the snowmaking machinery would not have been the basis upon which a 
willing licensor and a willing licensee would have established the 
royalty.”262 It then articulated the intuition that actual use is not the be-all 
and end-all of royalty terms determined after a licensing negotiation:  
[A] royalty based upon actual use would have been inconsistent 
with the function snowmaking equipment serves at a ski resort and 
the reasonable needs and expectations of both the licensor and the 
licensee. A resort has snowmaking machinery to enable it to 
function at times when there is no or insufficient natural snow. . . . 
[I]n these circumstances the number of hours a machine is used is 
irrelevant; the desire is never to use the machine. The machine’s 
utility simply does not depend upon its hours of operation. 
 A royalty based on actual use would produce unsatisfactory 
results here for both the licensor and the licensee. If there were 
extensive snow during the season, there would be little use of the 
machine and the patentee would receive an inadequate return for the 
value of his invention. On the other hand, if there were little or no 
 
 
of the patent to both parties and their relative bargaining power, based on information that was 
available pre-infringement.”) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
 257. 718 F.2d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 258. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 259. Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1076. 
 260. Id. at 1079 (emphasis added). 
 261. Id. at 1080. 
 262. Id. 
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snow, the licensee would have to pay exceptionally large 
royalties.
263
 
Perhaps, the fact that snow-making machines are a kind of an 
“insurance policy,” not meant to be used when there’s plenty of snow on 
the slopes, makes this case unusual.
264
 But Hanson’s larger point, already 
discussed in the context of the Lucent case, is well-taken: when parties 
negotiate a license agreement, they may not always tie the royalty rate to 
the frequency with which the patented function is actually used.
265
 Even 
when parties do take actual use into account, the value of the patented 
feature is estimated ex ante, and the extent of actual use may, or may not, 
closely track the pre-negotiation estimate.
266
 An unthinking application of 
the atomistic approach would contaminate this analysis with ex post 
features. The correct method for calculating the royalty is one that is 
supported by the facts of the case and the custom of the industry at 
issue,
267
 and direct infringement cases like Hanson demonstrate that actual 
usage cannot always serve as a strict limit on damages.  
Although the ex post approach to limiting damages as a matter of law 
is, for obvious reasons, favored by defendants, the step of “going back in 
time” to simulate a hypothetical negotiation does not always have to 
benefit the patentee.
268
 In Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA,
269
 
the Federal Circuit held that relying on the extent of actually infringing 
use of the patent would overcompensate the plaintiff because the invention 
was in very early stages of development at the time of first infringement, 
and the widespread demand for the patented technology could not 
 
 
 263. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
 264. It has been suggested that Hanson stands for the specific proposition that “reasonable royalty 
damages, even determined by the Georgia-Pacific approach, do not necessarily require the setting of a 
royalty rate that is applied to sales,” and the damages analysis may instead be focused on cost savings 
to the infringer as a measure of damages. See Methodologies for Determining Reasonable Royalty 
Damages, FISH & RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com/reasonableroyalty (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). 
Along with the Lucent court, however, I use the Hanson case for the more general proposition that a 
reasonable royalty would rarely be exclusively based on the extent of directly infringing use, since that 
is after all only one of the Georgia-Pacific factors. See supra text accompanying notes 163–67. 
 265. See supra text accompanying notes 227–30. 
 266. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 267. See Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (deciding that a lump 
sum rather than “actual use” reasonable royalty was appropriate because “qualified experts 
unequivocally testified that the food processing industry did not . . . utilize use royalties in connection 
with machines for producing food” and noting that the patentee “never offered anything other than a 
paid-up license for making and using the patented inventions”) (emphasis added).  
 268. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
 269. 331 F.3d 860, 871 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
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reasonably have been predicted or expected by the parties.
270
 This view is 
consonant with basic contract principles, which hold that parties cannot 
repudiate a license because the claimed feature turned out to be more (or 
less) successful than expected.
271
 Licensees (or licensors) may decide to 
commit an “efficient breach,” but they would still be responsible for 
damages for violating the terms of the license.
272
 The contract analogy 
makes sense for patent damages because, in contrast to many other torts, 
the legal rights of the plaintiff are defined in advance by claims over 
which a license could be negotiated.
273
 The contractual mechanism of the 
royalty agreement enables the parties to agree upon the cost of invading 
these rights.
274
 
Direct infringement cases discussed above cast serious doubt on 
approaches that would rigidly tie reasonable royalty damages to units 
actually used to infringe. Other than formalistic adherence to general tort 
law’s imputation principle or specific facts that call for a license based on 
actual use as determined ex post,
275
 there is no reason for the courts to 
depart from the approaches of Hanson and Integra in indirect infringement 
cases. The key, but ultimately irrelevant, difference between direct and 
indirect infringement when it comes to the “extent of infringing use” is 
this: In cases where liability is premised on the former, the extent has to do 
with how frequently the direct infringer uses a claimed feature,
 
and in the 
 
 
 270. Interestingly, the position that Microsoft took at oral argument in Lucent on evidence of how 
frequently the Outlook users utilized the claimed feature appears inconsistent with its theory that 
damages must be limited as a matter of law to actually infringing uses. Microsoft maintained that 
“information about how often the date-picker tool has in fact been used by consumers of Microsoft 
products,” which apparently was damaging to its case, was “irrelevant” because “such facts postdate 
the time of the hypothetical negotiation.” Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1333. Based on the “book of wisdom” 
principle, the Federal Circuit emphatically rejected this argument: “[N]either precedent nor economic 
logic requires us to ignore information about how often a patented invention has been used by 
infringers. Nor could they since frequency of expected use and predicted value are related.” Id.; see 
also supra text accompanying notes 120–21. Thus, post-negotiation events are relevant to the amount 
of damages, but they are not decisive. While, according to Lucent, damages should not be excised ex 
post for each Outlook unit that was not used to infringe, evidence of actual use helps the fact-finder to 
figure out how the parties would have valued the invention.  
 271. See, e.g., ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 367 (2d 
ed. 2004) (“General rules of contract law do not allow purchasers to repudiate their promises simply 
because they subsequently become dissatisfied with the deal, at least without compensating the other 
contracting party.”).  
 272. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
192 (6th ed. 2010) (illustrating the concept of efficient breach); see also id. at 86 (“[T]he promisor 
[may regard] it as less costly to pay damages than to meet its contract obligations unless the contract 
terms are modified.”). 
 273. See supra text accompanying note 92.  
 274. In tort law, measurement of damages for property torts probably provides the closest analogy. 
See supra text accompanying notes 91–94. 
 275. See supra text accompanying notes 245–47. 
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latter, two separate “frequency of use” layers can be discerned. The first is, 
how many end users of the indirect infringer’s product employed it in an 
infringing manner at all (i.e., at least once), and the second is how many 
times those users actually performed the claimed method.
276
 Both of these 
layers can, I think, be properly subsumed under the eleventh Georgia-
Pacific factor—“the extent to which the infringer has made use of the 
invention”—and taken into account in setting a reasonable royalty.277 
Again, it is helpful to consider what it is that the Georgia-Pacific 
factors are supposed to help the trier of fact to figure out. In an indirect 
infringement case like Lucent, it goes without saying that the fact-finder 
must determine the outcome of a hypothetical negotiation between the 
patentee and Microsoft, the indirect infringer, rather than having to divine 
the terms of individualized licenses between the patentee and each of 
Microsoft’s customers.278 Since it is likely that the agreement would have 
been based on the parties’ mutual understanding regarding the expected 
extent of the claimed feature’s utilization, rather than structured so as to 
monitor actual usage,
279
 both types of “frequency of use” layers would be 
properly included in the ex ante estimate of the popularity of the date-
picker feature. As long as the plaintiff can establish that a hypothetical 
negotiation would proceed in this manner,
280
 the case, at the damages 
stage, becomes no different from a direct infringement case where the 
 
 
 276. The “atomization” issue can arise in direct infringement cases as well. For example, a (direct 
infringement) defendant can argue that it performs the claimed method only in some units of an 
accused device that it uses, while the other units are employed in a noninfringing way. Under this 
view, infringing use of each unit of the device represents a separate tort. An argument along these lines 
was made in, for example, Inline Connection Corp. v. AOL Time Warner Inc., and rejected by the 
district court. 470 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D. Del. 2007). The court explained that “calculating a reasonable 
royalty is not merely a function of the number of infringing systems, other elements contribute to and 
influence the analysis.” Id. at 434. I focus here on the atomistic approach in the context of indirect 
infringement for two reasons. First, damages-limiting arguments of the sort discussed in this Article 
have appeared to gain more traction in indirect, as opposed to direct, infringement cases. I am not 
aware of a Federal Circuit decision in a direct infringement case parallel to Cardiac Pacemakers—
upholding a grant of summary judgment to limit damages to only those device units that have actually 
been used to infringe. Second, motions to limit damages in indirect infringement cases raise interesting 
issues involving a connection between primary and secondary liability not raised by direct 
infringement cases, perhaps making the atomistic approach easier to justify in the indirect 
infringement context. 
 277. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also 
supra text accompanying note 167. 
 278. See supra text accompanying note 142. 
 279. The point of monitoring use would be to ensure that no royalties are paid on software units 
that are never used in an infringing manner or to limit royalties when the licensee demonstrates that a 
feature is used rarely. Cf. supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text. 
 280. Of course, if the defendant can establish, at trial or at summary judgment, that the negotiation 
would not have proceeded in this manner, units could be properly excised from the royalty base. See 
also infra Part V.A.3.  
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extent of (expected) use is one of the many factors going into the 
reasonable royalty analysis. Lucent’s evidentiary approach thus mirrors the 
approach to damages generally taken in direct infringement cases, while 
Cardiac Pacemakers’ atomistic approach unjustifiably departs from the 
hypothetical negotiation framework and creates a per se rule for 
determining reasonable royalty damages for indirect infringement. 
3. The Evidentiary Approach Correctly Frames the Relevant Facts in 
Motions To Limit Damages as a Matter of Law 
Some courts, in patent and non-patent cases, have refused to rule on 
damages motions before the determination of liability. A few judges have 
justified this position by the text of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,
281
 while others have held that granting such motions would be 
improvident and used their inherent powers to refuse to rule on them.
282
 
Moreover, one litigant has even (unsuccessfully) argued that, given the 
inherently fact-specific nature of the hypothetical negotiation analysis, a 
summary judgment ruling on damages violated the Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial.
283
 Most courts have rightly rejected such arguments,
284
 
 
 
 281. See, e.g., Arado v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 626 F. Supp. 506, 508–09 (N.D. Ill. 1985) 
(“Rules 56(a) and 56(b) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure then in force] simply do not permit 
the piecemealing of a single claim or the type of issue-narrowing sought here,” namely partial 
summary judgment to prevent plaintiff from collecting “compensatory, consequential and liquidated 
damages”).  
 282. See, e.g., Kendall McGaw Labs., Inc. v. Cmty. Mem. Hosp., 125 F.R.D. 420, 422 (D.N.J. 
1989) (“A Rule 56 movant may not ‘play leapfrog’ with his case by seeking a decision whose validity 
depends on one or more unresolved issues. To allow another result would ignore the chronological 
structure of trial practice. . . . A different arrangement would run the law into conceptually-backward 
nonsense; damages do not bring forth liability any more than an injury produces a duty.”); Hoffmann-
La Roche Inc. v. Promega Corp., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1649 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (denying as 
premature a motion for summary adjudication of patent damages, which was brought prior to 
determination of liability); see also Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v. Biolitec, Inc., No. C-08-3129 MMC, 
2010 WL 3324893 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2010) (similar).  
 283. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 939, 951 (N.D. 
Ill. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 555 F.3d 984 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[P]recedent clearly establishes that 
the issue of patent damages can be resolved on summary judgment. . . . Defendants argue that the 
court’s grant of summary judgment violated their Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. There is 
no Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury when there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. 
Summary judgment is appropriate in instances where it has been established by one of the parties that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact on which a jury could find for the losing party. Not only was 
summary judgment applicable to the patent damages issue on summary judgment, but the record 
established that no genuine issue of material fact existed on the issue of damages.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 284. Indeed, the better and more widely accepted view is that motions for partial summary 
judgment on the measure of damages can be validly entertained under Rule 56. See, e.g., Hamblin v. 
British Airways PLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 303, 306–07 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Some courts have limited the 
availability of summary judgment motions to foreclosure of specific claims, not remedies. . . . 
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and judicial management of damages in patent cases is now well-
established.
285
 Nevertheless, although the courts can generally make 
rulings on damages before liability has been adjudicated, they should 
rarely grant motions to limit damages as a matter of law to proven 
instances of direct infringement in indirect infringement cases.
286
 When 
the facts are properly framed, such motions will typically fail the standards 
for granting summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. 
Under the “evidentiary/atomistic” analytical framework developed in 
this Article, a grant of summary judgment (or judgment as a matter of law) 
to limit indirect infringement damages to proven instances of direct 
infringement is proper only if there is no factual dispute that the parties 
would have based the royalty on actual (rather than expected) usage of the 
technology covered by the asserted patents.
287
 Even if the defendant offers 
uncontroverted proof that, say, customers used the date-picker feature in 
only sixty percent of Outlook software packages sold, the plaintiff could 
counter that this fact alone does not conclusively establish that the parties 
would have agreed that royalties should not be paid on the remaining forty 
percent.  
Indeed, a grant of a motion to limit damages to actually infringing units 
effectively means that basing damages on actual use is the sole legally 
acceptable way to calculate the reasonable royalty on the facts of the case. 
 
 
[However], I conclude that the word ‘claim’ in Rule 56 is not limited to the theory of liability that a 
plaintiff asserts. A theory of liability is useless to a plaintiff without remedies flowing from that claim, 
and so I see the ‘claim’ as being composed of both the theory of liability and the remedies that that 
theory supports.”); Williams v. J.P. Morgan & Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 189, 192–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); 
Highland Indus. Park, Inc. v. BEI Defense Sys. Co., 192 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (W.D. Ark. 2002).  
 285. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
 286. Besides summary judgment motions to limit damages, attempts to reduce the royalty base to 
only noninfringing units may be styled as motions in limine to exclude evidence. See, e.g., Telcordia 
Techs., Inc. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., Nos. 04-875 GMS, 04-876 GMS, 2007 WL 7076662, at *1–2 (D. 
Del. Apr. 27, 2007); see also Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 
459, 463–70 (D. Del. 2005) (discussing exclusion of evidence of post-infringement sales projections). 
Damages issues of the sort discussed in this Article also appear in Daubert motions to exclude 
evidence under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 837 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1122–26 (S.D. Cal. 2011). When it comes to attempts to limit damages in 
the guise of evidentiary motions, we might be well-served to follow Judge O’Malley’s remarks in 
Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius LLP, with regard to issues presented during in 
limine motions that should be left for the fact-finder: 
While a trial judge always may conclude that no reasonable trier of fact could reach a 
different conclusion than he on questions presented in a motion in limine, that is not what the 
trial judge did here. Not once did he address what a reasonable juror might or might not 
conclude on the facts presented. 
 676 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
 287. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (summary judgment should be granted when there is “no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”). 
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This result implies that, as a matter of law, there must be a reason to 
prevent the plaintiff from establishing the reasonable royalty by, say, 
multiplying the number of units capable of infringing by the royalty rate 
on sales of such units in comparable license agreements, or from 
calculating it by some other method.
288
 Under the Georgia-Pacific 
framework, it would be a tall order for a defendant to prove that all of the 
alternative approaches are legally untenable.
289
 Although a case where 
there is no genuine dispute that a royalty calculation would be based on 
actual use is surely possible, I imagine that it is rare. For example, the 
facts of Cardiac Pacemakers do not support the conclusion that, as a 
matter of law, the damages base should include only infringing ICD units. 
To sum up, in order to win on a motion to limit the royalty base, the 
defendant would need to show that the extent of directly infringing use 
would be the key factor in the hypothetical license negotiation—so 
important, in fact, that no reasonable jury could find that parties would 
have agreed to structure the license based on actual use. In the absence of 
such evidence, the defendant is left only to argue that damages on 
noninfringing units cannot be collected as a matter of law because its 
liability must be “atomized” into multiple acts of infringement by the 
direct infringer.
290
 But, as explained earlier, this position is inconsistent 
with the hypothetical negotiation approach and is likely to lead to 
inaccurate results.
291
   
 
 
 288. Other possibilities include basing the reasonable royalty primarily on cost savings to the 
defendant, Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1080–81 (Fed. Cir. 1983), or even 
comparing the method used with noninfringing alternatives in order to “estimat[e] the advantages 
conferred by the use of the patented technology.” Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 980 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
 289. Cf. Inline Connection Corp. v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (D. Del. 
2007) (noting that summary judgment is improper when the “parties’ experts use[d] different theories, 
data and reach[ed] different conclusions”); see also Minks v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 1364, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A comparison of the Georgia-Pacific factors and the standard of a hypothetical 
negotiation to the evidence of record in this case makes clear that the district court’s reduction of 
compensatory damages necessarily amounted to an assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence, and 
as such, the option of a new trial was required.”). 
 290. See supra text accompanying notes 244–46. 
 291. See supra Parts V.A.1 & V.A.2. 
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B. Theoretical Reasons for Adopting the Evidentiary Approach 
1. Indirect Patent Infringement Is Different from Secondary Liability 
in Other Areas of Tort Law 
The distinctive nature of indirect infringement in patent law militates 
against tying damages for this tort too closely to primary infringement. As 
discussed in the Introduction, secondary liability in intellectual property 
cases arises in factual scenarios that are quite different from their analogs 
in general tort law.
292
 The ubiquitous pattern of a manufacturer-inducer 
knowingly providing technology that allows a large number of customers 
to invade the legal rights of the patentee
293
 is a long way from “isolated 
acts of adolescents in rural society” that the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit tellingly thought to be emblematic of general secondary civil 
liability.
294
 Although the ultimate purpose of secondary liability is, of 
course, to compensate the patentee for harm from direct infringement,
295
 in 
patent cases that harm often stems largely from the indirect infringer’s 
conduct.  
Causation analysis helps justify the focus on the conduct of the indirect 
infringer in figuring a proper measure of damages and to explain why, 
among the intellectual property torts, such a focus is particularly 
appropriate in patent law. Stepping away from the framework of pure 
secondary liability
296
 and adopting the language of primary tort,
297
 one 
notes that the causal link between the acts of the inducer and the harm to 
the patentee is strong and direct.
298
 To take Lucent as an example, 
 
 
 292. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19.  
 293. See supra text accompanying notes 41–43.  
 294. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 16–17. 
 295. See supra text accompanying note 39. 
 296. By “pure” secondary liability, I have in mind a formulation that does not include the 
elements of proximate or but-for causation. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 63; see also supra 
Part II (formally, no causation element in establishing secondary patent infringement liability). 
 297. Incidentally, some courts require proof of a causation element to establish secondary liability 
in tort. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating the elements of 
secondary civil liability in Georgia: “(1) through improper action or wrongful conduct and without 
privilege, the defendant acted to procure a breach of the primary wrongdoer’s duty to the plaintiff; 
(2) with knowledge that the primary wrongdoer owed the plaintiff a duty, the defendant acted 
purposely and with malice and the intent to injure; (3) the defendant’s wrongful conduct procured a 
breach of the primary wrongdoer’s duty; and (4) the defendant’s tortious conduct proximately caused 
damage to the plaintiff”) (quoting Insight Tech., Inc. v. FreightCheck, LLC, 633 S.E.2d 373, 379 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2006)) (emphasis added) (alterations omitted). 
 298. Cf. Bartholomew & McArdle, supra note 35, at 698–704 (analyzing secondary civil liability 
in terms of causation and indicating that the courts do so as well); see Nathan Isaac Combs, Note, Civil 
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Microsoft knew (and likely expected—why else put in the date-picker 
feature and provide instructions on how to use it?) that Outlook users 
would click on the calendar,
299
 and supplied the technology without which 
most users would have been unable to perform the patented method.
300
 
Microsoft’s conduct was, thus, clearly a but-for cause of harm to the 
patentee, and the close connection between the conduct and the harm must 
mean that the proximate cause element was met as well.
301
  
The causation issue can be analyzed in another way. Even though acts 
of direct infringement are surely expressions of independent human will, 
they can hardly be said to be “superseding causes” that break the chain of 
causation between the conduct of the inducer and harm to the patentee.
302
 
As far as Outlook users know, they are doing nothing wrong when they 
are using the date-picker feature, and indeed their operation of the 
software in a tortious manner is perfectly reasonable and expected.
303
 The 
possibility of the direct infringement is a natural consequence of providing 
the Outlook software to the users, and it is eminently foreseeable.
304
 
 
 
Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 241, 292–99 (2005) (analyzing secondary liability in 
tort in terms of but-for cause, proximate cause, and foreseeability); see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas 
F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 4, 43–92 (2001) (arguing that 
patent infringement damages should follow the tort-law causation model, but without distinguishing 
direct and indirect infringement). But see Bartholomew, supra note 82, at 840–44 (calling inducement 
in copyright law “liability without causation”); see also supra Part II.C. 
 299. One of the fears of expansion of indirect liability is that legitimate commercial activity might 
unfairly become a target of an infringement suit. See, e.g., Rantanen, supra note 74, at 1591 
(“[I]ndirect infringement’s ability to deter must be balanced against the possibility of over-imposing 
liability on those who participate in commerce.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 31–32. 
However, the significant acts (i.e., selling the enabling technology and providing instructions to use it 
in an infringing manner) and elevated state of mind (i.e., knowledge of infringement of the patent) in 
many manufacturer-inducer cases create a tight causal link between the activities of the inducer and 
the harm to the patentee, which alleviates concerns about ensnaring legitimate commercial activity. 
See also infra text accompanying note 324. 
 300. It could be that Microsoft thought that Lucent’s patents were invalid or that it did not infringe 
them. But that only clears Microsoft of willful infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). The bottom 
line is that Microsoft was found liable in spite of what it believed, and the issue at the damages stage is 
the effect of Microsoft’s conduct on the patent right.  
 301. See Bartholomew & McArdle, supra note 35, at 703–04.  
 302. See J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW § 4:07 (2d ed. 2002) (“[A] 
superseding cause is one that alters the natural sequence of events and produces results that would not 
otherwise have occurred. Or one that is of such an extraordinary nature or so attenuates defendant’s 
negligence from the ultimate injury that responsibility for the injury may not be reasonably attributed 
to the defendant.”) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965). 
 303. See supra text accompanying notes 24–28. 
 304. Of course, actual harm occurs only in cases where the claimed method is used. The focus on 
the indirect infringer’s activity, however, helps explain why it may be unwise to measure the harm 
with the aid of the imputation formalism. 
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The tight causal link between activities of the indirect infringer and the 
harmful conduct of the primary tortfeasors in patent cases calls to mind the 
tort of negligent entrustment.
305
 Liability for this so-called “enabling tort” 
may lie when the tortfeasor negligently provides an instrumentality (often 
a car) to a person—usually someone of questionable reputation—who uses 
it to harm a victim.
306
 Although inducement of infringement is thought to 
lack the moral blameworthiness of an enabling tort
307
 and requires a 
different mens rea,
308
 there are instructive parallels, and differences, 
between the two torts. In indirect patent infringement cases, the inducer 
provides an instrumentality that enables tortious acts to take place while 
on notice that a number of end users, regardless of their reputation or 
character, could utilize the instrumentality in an infringing manner. 
Besides, the end users do so in the course of its normal operation—not 
during a “joyride,” as often happens in negligent entrustment cases.309 In 
terms of the relative allocation of responsibility between the primary 
tortfeasor and the enabler, indirect patent infringement seems much worse 
than negligent entrustment because the directly infringing end user is 
typically clueless and blameless.
310
 
Thus, given the close nexus between the acts of the inducer and the 
ultimate harm to the patentee, it is sensible to focus on those acts when 
determining the measure of damages caused by the direct infringements. 
This intuition, in turn, leads to the question of how much the inducer 
would pay the patentee for the right to provide the patented feature to the 
users rather than to approach the patentee’s loss formally as a sum total of 
harms from discrete instances of direct infringement.
 
The inducer was able 
to save on licensing, manufacturing, and design-around costs by including 
 
 
 305. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965) (“It is negligence to permit a third 
person to use a thing or to engage in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor 
knows or should know that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the 
activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”) (emphasis added). 
Unlike inducement of infringement, which is a form of secondary liability, negligent entrustment is an 
independent tort. See supra note 2. Still, negligent entrustment is helpful for purposes of illustration. 
 306. See, e.g., Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103, 105 (Vt. 1989) (“[C]ourts have allowed recovery 
against an automobile dealer who sold a vehicle to an inexperienced and incompetent driver whose 
driving injured several people when the seller knew or should have known of the incompetency.”) 
(citing Johnson v. Casetta, 197 Cal. App. 2d 272 (1961)). 
 307. See Sherkow, supra note 19, at 26 (“Inducement . . . is not a moral device but a tool 
concerned with providing economic recovery against ‘upstream’ infringers.”). But cf. Bartholomew, 
supra note 82, at 842 (discussing the moral dimensions of inducement liability in copyright law). 
 308. See supra Part II.B. 
 309. See, e.g., Turner v. Lotts, 422 S.E.2d 765 (Va. 1992). 
 310. See supra text accompanying note 29. Moreover, in contrast to direct patent infringement, 
many forces should deter the would-be primary tortfeasors from engaging in reckless driving—
criminal liability, personal liability in tort, physical injury, and moral opprobrium. 
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the “infringing capable” feature in all of the units of the product it sold, 
and it should owe the patentee compensation for those benefits.
311
  
The problem of end user deterrence reinforces these observations. 
Because patent infringement does not give rise to criminal liability,
312
 and 
individual customers like Outlook users are almost never sued in tort for 
direct patent infringement,
313
 there is essentially no practical legal 
mechanism for deterring direct infringers in many “infringing customer” 
cases. Copyright owners engage in “education” campaigns to warn those 
who copy files that they might get into trouble,
314
 but we typically don’t 
see patent owners like Lucent warning average consumers not to use 
certain features of their products. Indeed, by not providing for statutory 
 
 
 311. A related point, likening indirect infringement to an unfair competition tort, was advanced by 
a commentator in the early 1970s:  
Under the traditional view of patent infringement as a form of trespass on the case, it was 
reasonable for courts in early patent suits to view direct infringers and their aiders and 
abettors collectively as co-conspirators in a joint enterprise, acting in concert to commit a 
trespass, in pursuance of a common design. Such a view was and still is probably correct as 
far as the legal result, namely, joint and several liability, is concerned. However, a modern 
and more realistic approach to the nature of the tort itself suggests that patent infringement, in 
its ‘indirect’ form at least, is analogous to a tortious interference with economic relations. 
Thus, a large part of a patent’s value resides in probable expectancies in the form of future 
profits or royalties, rather than in present tangible value characteristic of the traditional 
forms of property involved in trespass actions. Therefore, the aiding and abetting of a direct 
infringer would seem to warrant ‘characterization’ as an injury or interference with such 
prospective economic advantages.  
Charles E. Miller, Some Views on the Law of Patent Infringement By Inducement, 53 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 86, 92 n.14 (1971) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 124 (3d 
ed. 1964) and Koratron Co. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 418 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1969)) (emphasis 
added). 
 312. Cf. Sherkow, supra note 19, at 4. In contrast, criminal liability is possible for copyright 
infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006); see also Joe Palazzolo, How Much Does Illegally Sharing a 
Song Cost? $9,250, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Sept. 11, 2012, 1:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/09/ 
11/how-much-does-illegally-sharing-a-song-cost-9250 (describing a successful lawsuit for direct 
copyright infringement). To be sure, there are instances of accidental copyright infringement that 
individuals may engage in every day. See generally John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright 
Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537. Still, there surely is more deliberate (i.e., 
knowingly wrongful) copyright infringement than deliberate patent infringement by ordinary 
consumers—which makes sense, because copyright infringement requires copying. 
 313. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
The fact that recent proliferation of threatened and actual infringement complaints against small-
business end users of patented technologies has shocked the conscience and led to reform proposals 
that would limit such suits in favor of suits against manufacturers reinforces the close nexus between 
indirect infringement and harm to the patentee. See, e.g., Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding 
Patent Law’s Customer Suit Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1614 (2013) (calling manufacturers “the 
true party in interest” in cases where customers are sued). 
 314. See Programs for Educators, RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., http://riaa.org/toolsfor 
parents.php?content_selector=resources-programs-for-educators (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). 
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damages
315
 and barring double recovery
316
 from direct and indirect 
infringers (both of which are allowed in copyright law),
317
 the Patent Act 
makes deterrence of direct infringement in some cases so impractical as to 
be all but impossible.
318
 In contrast, a manufacturer-inducer like Microsoft 
must, by hypothesis, be aware of the patent in order to incur liability and 
may be in position to avoid infringement by redesigning the infringing 
product or entering into a license agreement.
319
 In line with this reality, 
patent law aims to deter infringement by imposing liability on the 
manufacturers and allowing patentees to collect compensation from them 
on indirect liability theories.
320
 The law’s focus on the indirect infringer as 
the source of legal recourse for the patentee in cases where direct 
infringement entails personal use of the technology covered by the patents 
makes it difficult to insist on the legal fiction of imputation in the damages 
context.  
Indeed, patent law already effectively sidesteps the imputation 
formalism in other contexts. For example, when the courts enjoin indirect 
infringers, they do not merely order them to stop carrying out acts of 
active inducement (e.g., providing instructions to end users). The courts, 
tellingly, do not leave the patentee with the option to sue and pursue 
injunctions against each end user who continues to carry out infringing 
acts once the inducing conduct ceases. Instead, they generally enjoin the 
inducer from “making” and “selling” the product capable of carrying out 
the claimed method, which are distinctly § 271(a), not § 271(b), 
 
 
 315. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006) (statutory damages for copyright infringement). 
 316. See Jerry R. Selinger & Jessica W. Young, Suing an Infringing Competitor’s Customers: Or, 
Life Under the Single Recovery Rule, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 19 (1997). 
 317. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006); supra text accompanying note 315; see also Arista Records LLC 
v. Lime Grp. LLC, No. 06-CV-5936(KMW), 2011 WL 1338194, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2011) 
(examining “whether a plaintiff should be precluded from recovering a statutory damage award from a 
secondarily liable inducer, with respect to those sound recordings for which that plaintiff has already 
obtained a judgment against an individual direct infringer,” and holding that “[s]ection 504 does not 
state that a copyright owner is limited to a single statutory damage award for each work, no matter 
how many actions the owner brings”). 
 318. Patent law also lacks a right of contribution, though such a right was recently proposed. See 
Bernard Chao, The Case for Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 97 (2011). 
 319. See Rantanen, supra note 74, at 1591 (“Indirect infringement . . . serves a deterrence 
function, as it incentivizes parties to avoid or minimize conduct that results in third-party 
infringement.”). Nevertheless, the deterrence rationale might be weaker for indirect infringers who 
developed the infringing technology before they knew of the patent. See Love, supra note 126, at 934–
41 (explaining why the deterrence rationale does not apply to independent developers unaware of the 
patent). 
 320. See also supra text accompanying note 19.  
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activities.
321
 This result is reasonable—it is the “making” and “selling,” 
not “actively inducing,” that is likely to be the more significant cause of 
the harm to the patentee.
322
 Furthermore, as discussed above, the 
hypothetical negotiation in inducement cases is assumed to take place 
between the patentee and the inducer, not between the patentee and 
multiple end users.
323
  
Thus, in some important ways, the courts basically treat inducers 
almost as if they were direct infringers. This approach reflects the intuition 
that, in many cases, inducers seem to have done everything possible to 
ensure that patent infringement would occur,
324
 but avoided actually 
performing the claimed steps themselves. It would appear incoherent for 
the courts to retreat from this position at the point of assessment of 
damages, and switch to treating indirect infringement as a series of 
discrete directly infringing acts imputed onto the inducer. 
2. The Evidentiary Approach Properly Tracks the Scope of the Patent 
Right 
The reader might come to believe that, contrary to sound policy and 
established law, I advocate extending the scope of the patent right to 
unpatented items. Indeed, it is beyond reasonable dispute that, as the 
district court in A&L Technology v. Resound Corp. put it, “the established 
 
 
 321. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 2238 (2011) (affirming an injunction to prohibit “Microsoft from . . . selling, offering to sell, 
and/or importing into the United States any infringing Word products with the capability of opening 
XML files containing custom XML”) (emphasis added); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1364–65, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (underlying direct infringement satisfied 
by “physicians order[ing] assays and correlat[ing] the results of those assays”; actus reus of 
inducement satisfied by “LabCorp publish[ing] both Continuing Medical Education articles as well as 
a Directory of Services that are specifically targeted to the medical doctors ordering the LabCorp 
assays”; scope of injunction: “to enjoin LabCorp from performing [the inducing] test”) (emphases 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax Pharm., Inc., 501 F.3d 
1263, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under the standards for inducement which we apply to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(b), [the indirect infringer] has therefore actively induced the acts of [the direct infringer] that 
will constitute direct infringement . . . and it was thus not inappropriate for the district court to include 
[the indirect infringer along with the direct infringer] within the scope of the injunction.”). 
 322. Perhaps this is just a more efficient way to remedy the infringement—inducing acts might be 
more difficult to monitor than, for example, sales. An argument can certainly be made that the courts 
issuing injunctions in indirect infringement cases should order defendants to stop “inducing” rather 
than “making” and “selling.” But I think it is telling that they do not. 
 323. See supra text accompanying notes 140–42. 
 324. Notably, a decision that is widely regarded to usher in indirect liability in patent law called 
such acts of aiding direct infringement a “palpable interference” with the patent right. Wallace v. 
Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100). See Adams, supra note 14, at 371–72 
(discussing Wallace); see also supra note 311 and accompanying text. 
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royalty rate . . . should be applied only to sales of infringing products to 
avoid running afoul of the policy in patent law against extending patents 
beyond their lawful scope.”325 Doesn’t inclusion of units that have not 
been used to infringe in the royalty base in effect result in charging the 
indirect infringer for selling a noninfringing product? One answer, already 
suggested above, is that the royalty rate that properly tracks the chosen 
royalty base will ensure appropriate compensation for the patentee.
326
 But 
there is another reason, related to the principle of using “convoyed” or 
collateral sales of non-patented items with the patented item to determine 
the proper royalty,
327
 that counting “infringing capable” units in the 
royalty base is consistent with established patent damages principles.
328
  
Explaining convoyed sales, the A&L court modified its seemingly 
black-and-white “lawful scope” statement when it stated that the “licensee 
would in theory be disposed to pay a higher royalty if it could 
expect . . . collateral benefits,”329 such as sales on non-patented products 
that form a “functional unit” with the product covered by the claims of the 
asserted patent.
330
 Although somewhat controversial,
331
 this rule has long 
been a mainstay of patent law.
332
 Convoyed sales are subsumed under the 
sixth Georgia-Pacific factor,
333
 firmly entrenched in the reasonable royalty 
 
 
 325. No. C-93-00107-CW, 1995 WL 415146, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 1995). 
 326. Although the Federal Circuit held that it is error to adjust the royalty rate to make up for the 
incorrect royalty base, see supra text accompanying note 250, my argument at supra Part V.A.1 is 
precisely that the royalty base that includes noninfringing units can be correct in many circumstances. 
 327. See, e.g., Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., Inc., 514 F.3d 1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A 
‘convoyed sale’ refers to the relationship between the sale of a patented product and a functionally 
associated non-patented product.”); Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 
1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The jury was entitled to rely on evidence of bundling [of the product covered 
by the patent with the product not covered by the patent] and convoyed sales in determining the proper 
scope of the royalty base.”). 
 328. Cf. Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1385 (“[Earlier precedent] does not require that 
estimates of sales revenues, as referenced in a hypothetical negotiation at the time infringement began, 
must later bear a close relation to actual sales revenue. Such a proposition would essentially eviscerate 
the rule that recognizes sales expectations at the time when infringement begins as a basis for a 
royalty base as opposed to an after-the-fact counting of actual sales.”) (emphasis added). 
 329. A&L Tech., 1995 WL 415146, at *1. 
 330. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 331. Id. at 1556 (Nies, J., dissenting) (“A royalty must be based on the value of the patented hook, 
not on other features in the infringing device, e.g., the motors, which form no part of the patented 
invention used by [the defendant]”); Lemley, supra note 107, at 665 (criticizing the importation of the 
concept of “convoyed goods” from lost profits cases into the reasonable royalty context). 
 332. Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1385; State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 
1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986); 
Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  
 333. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (this factor 
is “[t]he effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee; the 
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damages jurisprudence.
334
 In addition, convoyed sales can and do become 
a part of the royalty base, though of course the fact-finder must be careful 
to avoid double-counting this factor.
335
 
To prove convoyed sales,
336
 the patent owner must generally show that 
the purchase of the convoyed good was driven by the demand for the 
claimed feature,
337
 or at the very least associated in some way with the 
product that includes that feature.
338
 By analogy, if the plaintiff can show 
that the claimed feature was responsible for generating some of the 
demand for the product, it does not seem far-fetched to charge the indirect 
infringer a royalty on each sale of the product containing the feature. As 
one of the amicus briefs in Lucent noted, this scenario is easily foreseeable 
for inventions whose value to their user lies in their capability of 
performing the claimed method—be they airbags, defibrillators, or snow-
making machines.
339
  
 
 
existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the 
extent of such derivative or convoyed sales”) (emphasis added). 
 334. See State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1580 (“The value of collateral sales could also be factored into 
the royalty rate.”) (citing Deere & Co. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); 
see also Michael R. Annis & Brad L. Pursel, Intellectual Property Valuation Under U.S. GAAP and 
the Impact on Intellectual Property Litigation, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 373, 390 (2010) (“A reasonable royalty 
rate accounts for derivative sales because a hypothetical licensee expecting a patent to generate such 
sales would pay a higher royalty.”). 
 335. As with the “extent of infringing use” factor, the convoyed sales analysis should be properly 
applied only once to determine the royalty rate or the royalty base, or else used in a holistic reasonable 
royalty determination to award a lump-sum royalty. Cf. Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1385 
(discussing “unfair double recovery” when using convoyed sales to adjust both the rate and the base); 
see Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549 n.9 (“[The] issue of royalty base is not to be confused with the relevance 
of anticipated collateral sales to the determination of a reasonable royalty rate.”). 
 336. The convoyed sales principle started off as only applicable to lost profits but expanded to 
reasonable royalties. See infra note 345 and accompanying text. I think that the atomistic approach is 
also generally unsuitable when the measure of damages is lost profits in part because it would be 
inconsistent with the economic realities underlying the convoyed sales principle. However, the 
analysis is different because the lost profits approach involves an ex post determination of what sales 
the plaintiff has lost due to the infringement and does not have anything to do with a hypothetical 
negotiation between the parties. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 256, at 14 (explaining that lost profits and 
reasonable royalties measures of patent damages are fundamentally different because “[e]ach conforms 
to a different remedial conception”; lost profits is an ex post measure and “serves with great accuracy 
the ‘make whole’ principle,” while reasonable royalty is an ex ante measure and “mimics the bargain 
that would have been struck,” thus “protect[ing] the patentee’s market position”). In indirect 
infringement cases where the lost profits measure is used, the relevant question is whether the patentee 
lost sales based on the indirect infringer’s sales of “infringing capable” units—and if the plaintiff can 
prove that this is the case, it should collect lost profits damages on sales of such units. 
 337. See, e.g., Laserdynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 338. Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 339. See Brief of 13 Diverse Innovators as Amici Curiae in Support of Lucent Technologies, Inc. 
at 26, Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Nos. 2008-1485, 2008-
1486, 2008-1487, 2008-1495), 2009 WL 870147, at *26 (“[T]here are some inventions having value 
that is derived from just being available, not from actually being used. For example, someone buying 
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Of course, when taken to its logical extreme, the argument for 
assessing damages on “capability” products collapses. If an individual user 
bought a defibrillator capable of performing the claimed method of 
cardioversion when deployed, but ended up never needing the 
defibrillator, no infringement damages would be due from that person 
because he or she has not performed acts giving rise to liability. This is a 
difficult outcome for the patentee, but the problem could have perhaps 
been anticipated with appropriate claim drafting.
340
  
The situation is different, however, in the Lucent and Cardiac 
Pacemakers cases. There, liability for indirect infringement had already 
been established, and the infringement actions proceeded to the separate 
step of damages assessment.
341
 At that stage, the question of whether to 
include noninfringing but “infringing capable” units in the royalty base 
merely relates to how to best measure the magnitude of legal harm to the 
right to exclude that occurred due to the infringement.
342
 The hypothetical 
negotiation analysis tackles this question, with the fact-finder having to 
figure out whether noninfringing units would have been included in the 
royalty base by the parties.
343
 In some situations, the patentee would have 
surely received a royalty payment on the sale based only on the predicted 
demand for the feature covered by the patent—regardless of whether the 
claimed method was actually practiced by the end user.
344
 Assessing 
damages on such sales in the reasonable royalty context is thus consistent 
with the but-for test that underlies the convoyed sales principle.
345
 
 
 
an automobile probably considers an airbag an important feature. But an airbag has value even if it is 
never actually used—in fact, the customer hopes it is never used. In this situation, therefore, the value 
of a patent on the use of airbags to a prospective licensee—and thus the royalty that would be the 
result of the hypothetical negotiation—would depend on the number of airbags to be placed in 
vehicles, not the number of airbags that might subsequently inflate in collisions. The same thing could 
be said for any number of inventions, from defibrillators to antivirus software to spare tires. Requiring 
district courts in these situations to limit damages awards based on the actual use of the invention, 
rather than on the invention’s real value, would divorce the damages analysis from economic reality.”). 
 340. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., Capability Claiming, available at https://www.law.stanford. 
edu/sites/default/files/event/266396/media/slspublic/Panel%201%20-%20Mark%20Lemley,%20et% 
20al%20-%20Capability%20Claiming.pdf (explaining how method claims cast in functional terms, 
such as claims that include “capable of” phrasing, may afford broader claim coverage). Apparatus 
claims can also help the patent owner in this scenario. See supra text accompanying notes 52–53. 
 341. That is, the focus at this point is on measuring damages appropriate to compensate the 
patentee, a task that can be accomplished using all infringing capable units as the royalty base. See 
supra Parts IV.A.2 & IV.B; see also supra note 319 and accompanying text.  
 342. See supra note 322 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra Part V.A.2. 
 344. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 345. See Seaman, supra note 132, at 1700–01 (explaining that the “entire market value” analysis 
in the reasonable royalty context represents an extension of the convoyed sales principle from lost 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/3
  
 
 
 
 
2014] DAMAGES FOR INDIRECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT 975 
 
 
 
 
The general approach of “liability opening the door to damages” is not 
unprecedented. In the well-known case of Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn 
Pictures Corp.,
346
 the Second Circuit (per Judge Learned Hand) allowed 
the plaintiff to recover damages for exploitation of a copyrighted work 
abroad. Although the rule of Sheldon is in tension with the principle of 
territoriality of copyright law,
347
 the court reasoned that, because the initial 
act of infringement (i.e., copying) occurred in the United States, damages 
attributable to the infringement—no matter where the copyrighted work 
was ultimately used—could be properly assessed on the theory of 
constructive trust.
348
 While the issue in Sheldon is not exactly analogous, 
the case provides an interesting example of a court’s refusal to approach 
infringement as a series of multiple, atomized sub-torts at the damages 
stage of the case.
349
 
I do not mean to suggest that the atomistic approach is inapplicable in 
all patent damages scenarios. Nevertheless, the principle of convoyed sales 
 
 
profits cases to reasonable royalties). See generally Blair & Cotter, supra note 298 (advocating the but-
for approach for patent damages generally). 
 346. 106 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940); accord L.A. News Serv. v. 
Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Under the Second Circuit’s rule . . . 
a party becomes liable for extraterritorial damages only when an act of infringement occurs within the 
United States, subjecting it to liability as an infringer (or a contributory infringer) under the Copyright 
Act.”). 
 347. L.A. News, 149 F.3d at 990–91.  
 348. Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 52. The implications of this approach to patent damages are worth 
exploring. It is well-settled that a sale of a patented item abroad is outside of the reach of U.S. patent 
law. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915). Thus, license 
agreements based on U.S. patents do not generally trigger royalty obligations for extraterritorial sales. 
A more interesting situation would arise if the sale of a unit occurred in the United States but the 
method was practiced abroad. Since the test is what the parties would have agreed to in a hypothetical 
negotiation, it would appear that the plaintiff could collect damages for such units if it could prove that 
the royalty agreement would have been based on sales—without regard to where the infringing item 
would be used. However, the powerful presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. patent 
law might militate against the award of damages in this scenario and justify “atomistic” reasoning 
here. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007); see also Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2129–36 (2008) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s strict application of the presumption against extraterritoriality). Thus, 
I do not necessarily advocate collecting damages for indirect patent infringement when the steps of the 
claimed method are carried out abroad. Cf. Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, 
Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he underlying question here remains whether [the 
plaintiff] is entitled to compensatory damages for injury caused by infringing activity that occurred 
outside the territory of the United States. The answer is no. . . . [T]he entirely extraterritorial 
production, use, or sale of an invention patented in the United States is an independent, intervening act 
that, under almost all circumstances, cuts off the chain of causation initiated by an act of domestic 
infringement.”).  
 349. See also Tire Eng’g & Distribution, LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 
308 (4th Cir. 2012) (adopting this so-called “predicate-act doctrine” for copyright damages in the 
Fourth Circuit).  
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supports the general point that the evidentiary approach to the measure of 
damages is not unprecedented and does not impermissibly 
overcompensate the patentee. In indirect patent infringement cases, it is 
not that inducers are charged for selling items that only have the capability 
to infringe. Instead, the issue is better viewed as follows: Upon being 
found liable for indirect infringement, the defendants may become 
exposed to a measure of damages that, in order to ensure an accurate 
calculation of harm, includes all “infringing capable” units in the royalty 
base. In contrast, the atomistic approach analytically breaks down the 
indirect infringement into individual sub-torts
350
 and limits the damages 
accordingly. This sort of analysis, however, is in tension with the but-for 
approach adopted for convoyed sales, which treats damages holistically.
351
 
If the defendant can be charged for sales of convoyed but completely 
unpatented items, it appears consistent to also charge it for sales (at the 
appropriate royalty rate) of “infringing capable” items on which the parties 
would have based the royalty.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The law of damages is a highly contentious part of patent litigation, 
and numerous reform proposals have been introduced to ensure that 
damages awards for infringement provide an appropriate level of 
compensation for patent owners without becoming punitive or out of 
proportion to the value of the patented invention.
352
 It is often said that the 
courts have struggled to fulfill their gatekeeping role under the current 
legal framework for measuring patent damages,
353
 though other 
commentators have argued to the contrary
354
 and recent cases indicate a 
 
 
 350. See supra text accompanying note 212. 
 351. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Cf. Seaman, 
supra note 132, at 1700–01. 
 352. Durie & Lemley, supra note 124 (providing an approach to reasonable royalties that might 
help the courts more effectively serve their gatekeeping function); Love, supra note 126 (suggesting 
reforms that might ensure that reasonable royalty damages do not effectively become punitive); David 
W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127 (2009) 
(criticizing and discussing proposed Congressional reforms of patent damages); John W. Schlicher, 
Patent Damages, the Patent Reform Act, and Better Alternatives for the Courts and Congress, 91 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 19, 41–43, 56–58 (2009) (similar).  
 353. See, e.g., Bensen & White, supra note 100; Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: 
Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
307 (2006); Durie & Lemley, supra note 124; Love, supra note 126. 
 354. Martha K. Gooding & William C. Rooklidge, The Real Problem with Patent Infringement 
Damages, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 484, 506 (2009) (“There is a common perception that 
‘damage awards are seldom overturned on appeal.’ That perception is wrong. Even discounting 
damage awards that are overturned because of reversal or vacatur of the underlying liability ruling, the 
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trend toward increasingly vigorous review of damages awards at the 
Federal Circuit.
355
  
This Article has focused on damages for indirect infringement and 
discussed two Federal Circuit opinions that reflect this trend. One of the 
opinions, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,
356
 has 
endorsed a special damage-limiting rule for indirect infringement cases 
that may result in systematic undercompensation of patent plaintiffs.
357
 
The Cardiac Pacemakers rule is misguided. Secondary liability in patent 
law has firm historical roots,
358
 making suspect an approach that departs 
from established principles and likely results in an artificially low 
compensation for indirect infringement.
359
  
Furthermore, the inducement of infringement cause of action under 
§ 271(b) often provides the only realistic route for enforcing method 
claims.
360
 Although they are an integral part of the statutory scheme,
361
 
method claims are already somewhat disfavored because of the evidentiary 
difficulties associated with proving their infringement
362
 and doctrines that 
limit their usefulness.
363
 Cardiac Pacemakers further singles out method 
 
 
Federal Circuit has overturned many damages awards. Indeed, the Federal Circuit repeatedly has 
shown willingness to overturn jury damages verdicts.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Opderbeck, supra 
note 352, at 131. 
 355. Laserdynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Uniloc USA, 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks 
Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 356. 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 357. See supra Part IV.B. 
 358. See generally Adams, supra note 14. 
 359. Cf. supra Part V.A.2. 
 360. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 361. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (defining “process” as “process, art, or method, and . . . a new use 
of a known process”) (emphases added); id. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 362. See Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 957–58 n.188 
(2011) (describing evidentiary difficulties in proving infringement of method claims and other 
disadvantages of such claims); see also Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 148 
(2000) (“[P]olicing prohibited uses of patented inventions is notoriously difficult. For precisely this 
reason it is a maxim—and almost a cliché—that a patent owner would rather hold a product patent 
than a process patent. . . . [P]rocess infringement occurs behind the scenes, in use or production of the 
unpatented materials, and it is not always possible to tell whether the materials were made via the 
patented process or via some other public domain process.”).  
 363. See, e.g., Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305–06 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (explaining the difficulty of 
establishing direct infringement of method claims in the “divided infringement” context); Cardiac 
Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1359–65 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc in relevant 
part) (concluding that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), which holds liable for infringement those who supply from 
the U.S. “all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention” or “any component of 
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claims for unfavorable treatment and does so in a manner inconsistent with 
the widely accepted hypothetical negotiation framework. Just as uncertain 
patentability of method claims might reduce incentives to innovate in 
industries where other claim types provide little useful coverage or are 
difficult to draft,
364
 availability of systematically lower damages for 
indirect infringement of such claims might lead to the same undesirable 
effect. 
In devising a uniform approach to indirect infringement damages, the 
courts should take into account the policies behind the indirect 
infringement causes of action and the important role that method claims 
play in providing patent protection. The first step in the search for the 
proper remedial approach, however, is to realize that secondary liability in 
patent law is quite different from its tort law roots, which calls into 
question the value of the imputation formalism in the damages analysis. 
 
 
a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention” for 
assembly abroad, does not apply to method claims); see also Christopher T. Abernethy, Cruel Hand of 
Bilski: Culminating the Shortsighted Crusade for the Marginalization of the ‘Process’ Patent (May 
2009) (unpublished comment), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1420205 (describing 
challenges to the patent eligibility of method claims directed to certain subject matter). 
 364. See Abernethy, supra note 363, at 24–27. 
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